



ELSEVIER

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

New Ideas in Psychology

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/newideapsych

Mapping the field of the whole human: Toward a form psychology

Eric L. Johnson*

Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2825 Lexington Rd., Louisville, KY 40280, USA

A B S T R A C T

Keywords:

Form
 Personality
 Personal agent
 Self
 Character
 Narrative
 Communion
Imago Dei
 Modern psychology

The concept of personality has served as the model of the whole human being within modern psychology for most of the 20th century. However, the original reasons for this selection were based on philosophical assumptions that have since come to be rejected by philosophers of science. Other approaches to the whole human have been identified within psychology, as well as philosophy and theology, which can also serve as models of the whole human in psychology, and which highlight additional, distinctly human kinds of psychological wholeness. The value of a number of the most important models will be discussed, and it will be suggested that the concept of form could serve as a higher-order concept for the psychological subdiscipline of the whole human being.

© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Since the founding of modern American psychology, there has been the recognition that a science of individual human beings has among its responsibilities the description of the “whole human.” William James (1890), for example, in his classic “Principles of Psychology,” devoted a chapter to the consciousness of the self. The advent of behaviorism led to a much greater focus on molecular dynamics (stimulus–response units) than to molar considerations in the first half of the 20th century. Yet in spite of these pressures, Gordon Allport (1937), Henry Murray (1938), and Ross Stagner (1937) (among others) contributed to the founding of a subdiscipline that was focused on the whole human and was consistent with the concerns of the reigning philosophy of science of the day, and they settled on *personality* as its focus. As a result, for the latter half of the 20th century, a course in personality was required in most undergraduate psychology programs, and hundreds of Ph.D.’s were awarded in this area.

A renewed wave of more sophisticated molecularism struck the field in the 60s and 70s, due in part to the cognitive revolution and empowered by new research methods that demonstrated the power of the situation to influence human behavior and interact with internal

factors like personality traits (Mischel, 1973). Enough questions were being raised about the existence of personality that, for a time, in some circles, personality study was eclipsed by or at least competed with social psychology.

Proponents of personality “fought back” with their own comprehensive research, in which they documented better the cross-situational resilience of traits (though this debate is far from over). As a result, over the last 25 years, a modest revival of personality psychology has been occurring, more dynamic and sophisticated than ever before, strengthened by the controversies and by creative research and theorizing that has moved in some new and synergistic directions (Cervone, 2004; John, Robins, & Pervin, 2008; Mayer, 2005; McAdams, 1993; McAdams & Pals, 2006; Mischel & Shoda, 2008).

1. Deeper questions

Consequently, the field is currently in some degree of foment, so this may be a good time to step back and ask some foundational questions. For example, why did modern psychology adopt *personality* as its approach to the “whole human” and reject other alternatives current in the literature (like character and the self)? How comprehensive, in fact, is the study of personality conducted by

* Tel.: +1 502 897 4223.

E-mail address: ejohnson@sbts.edu.

modern psychology? Are there other legitimate psychological perspectives on the “whole human” that are left out of the modern study of personality? For example, are there other bodies of thought and research, both contemporary and ancient that also describe the “whole human” in valid and illuminating ways, but provide a different perspective on human beings than that of personality? In the following article it will be suggested that answers to these questions could lead the field of the whole human into a more comprehensive multiperspective subdiscipline that altogether would better describe the actual nature of human beings and their unique complexity (and thus increase its validity).

This will require the recognition that, while rightly aiming at and over time increasingly approximating a valid description of reality, science is also shaped by sociohistorical, philosophical, and political forces that exercise their influence mostly implicitly, and so usually outside the awareness of the scientists themselves. Personality psychology is no exception (Danziger, 1990, 1997; Mischel, 1992; Nicholson, 2003; Sanford, 1992).

Though there is not space here to demonstrate these claims fully, some justification is obviously necessary. According to many cultural historians, and historians of psychology and sociology, a revolution was occurring in the cultural life of America in the late 1800s and early 1900s that involved a radical shift in basic beliefs among America’s intellectual and educational leaders (Cushman, 1996; Danziger, 2008; Marsden, 1994; Robinson, 1981; Smith, 2003)—the move from a theistic to a naturalistic worldview—and modern psychology played a crucial role in this transition. Moreover, one of the methods used to promote this shift was a change in language (Danziger, 1997; Nicholson, 2003).

1.1. *The logic and legacy of positivism*

A major impetus for the “new psychology” that emerged in the late 1800s was positivism. First articulated by Auguste Comte (1798–1857), positivism is a system of assumptions regarding what can count for “positive” knowledge. According to Boring (1950), “positive” for Comte meant “not speculative or inferential,” but “basic, observational, preinferential, undebatable” (p. 633). The seemingly unresolvable religious and philosophical conflicts of previous centuries and the successes of the scientific revolution had convinced many in Europe that human knowledge had to be based strictly on empirical evidence, rather than philosophical, theological, or traditional sources. This entailed the rejection of metaphysics (the philosophical subdiscipline concerned with the nature of things, including the nature of God and human beings) and the making of any metaphysical claims and concentrating exclusively on the investigation of the objective world. Comte sought to ground all “positive” assertions about reality on a strictly empirical basis. As a result, claims about anything that could not be verified through observation (and the logical and analytic discipline of mathematics) were considered mere speculation and unworthy of the word “knowledge.”

There were two later stages of positivism that also shaped modern American psychology: Machian and logical positivism. Influenced by Comte, as well as Hume and Mill, one of Ernst Mach’s goals was to restrict scientific discourse completely to descriptions of sensations and direct experience, in order to “rid science once and for all of every trace of ‘metaphysics’” (Robinson, 1992, p. 65; Hergenhahn, 1997). Many of the early modern psychologists after Wundt (e.g., Külpe, Ebbinghaus, Titchener, James) affirmed Mach’s understanding of science (Danziger, 1979). However, logical positivism had the greatest direct impact on 20th century American psychology. Accepting the basic orientation of Comte and Mach, logical positivists developed a philosophy of science in the 1920s and 1930s that was easily the most impressive of its day. They sought to base science solely on observations, by developing a rigorous set of logical rules for relating empirical terms and theoretical terms, enabling scientists to avoid reliance on any empirically unverifiable (metaphysical or epistemological) assumptions in their work (Suppe, 1977). For three decades this model persuaded most American scientists that ethical and metaphysical discourse was (quite literally) irrational nonsense.¹

Modern American psychology was already heavily under the sway of positivism by the time logical positivism emerged in the 1930s (Danziger, 1979; Klein, 1970; Leahey, 1997; Robinson, 1981; Toulmin & Leary, 1992²). Its rigor led many of the leading psychologists of the day to seek to apply its model to their discipline, and convinced the majority of psychologists of that generation of the superlative value of the study of animal behavior and to reject reference to unprovable, non-observable, metaphysical entities like thoughts, volition, the self, and ethics. Everything in psychology

¹ This is not the place to explain in detail the developments in philosophy of science and epistemology that led to the overturning of the “received view” of logical positivism. Those interested may wish to consult Alston (1992), Kuhn (1962, 1977), Lakatos (1970), Polanyi (1958, 1966), Suppe (1977), Toulmin (1972), and Toulmin and Leary (1992). The most serious problem was that positivism was recognized to be self-refuting since it is based on a claim about knowledge that itself cannot be empirically verified (e.g., only propositions that can be empirically verified are true), and the same applies to other principles basic to science (e.g., the functioning of the world is uniform). Kuhn (1962) wrote the most influential critique of the received view by documenting historically that progress in science actually occurs as a result of social and institutional dynamics that involve subjective processes, as well as rationality and careful observation. For example, scientists assume and work within a paradigm—a set of beliefs that include observational and theoretical postulates, as well as presuppositions that cannot necessarily be proven. Though elements of Kuhn’s treatment of the issues have been criticized (Suppe, 1977), contemporary philosophy of science has left positivism far behind (see e.g., Ray, 2000). Also of interest to psychology are more sophisticated models of epistemology that have arisen since (that have influenced the present work). It is ironic that whereas the psychology of the 1930s seemed to be overly smitten with the philosophy of science of its day, psychology since then has largely maintained the tradition and not kept up with the ongoing developments in contemporary philosophy of science and epistemology (see for example, Alston, 2006; Audi, 2002; Moser, 2005; Newton-Smith, 2000; Sosa, 2009).

² Four decades previously Williams James (1890) had endorsed and expounded a broadly positivist vision of psychology. See Vol. 1, p. 183.

now had to be operationalized and careful observation, quantification, and testing of hypotheses became the defining hallmarks of scientific psychology (see Hull, 1943; Skinner, 1938, 1956, Stevens, 1935, 1939, 1951; Tolman, 1948; for discussion see Bem & de Jong, 2006; Kilborne, 1992; Klein, 1970; Leahey, 1997; Toulmin & Leary, 1992). Method became the new metaphysics (Robinson, 1981). As a result, modern psychologists strictly limited their discourse to value-free description and quantification of psychological phenomena and the explanation of their causal relations.

Another stream of thought affecting the psychology of that time has been termed atomism (or elementalism or molecularism). Much of the power of physics and chemistry was seen to lie in their empirically-based analysis of physical reality into its most basic, component parts: atoms and molecules in physics and elements in chemistry. Aided by empiricist philosophers like Locke, Hume, and Mill, who attempted to analyze human thought into its component sensations and ideas, combined with the latent “physics envy” common to those in the young social sciences, the atomistic ideal of science led some psychologists on a similar search for the basic structures of the human mind, as suggested in the title of Thorndike’s (1905) major psychology text “Elements of Psychology.” Though a student of James, he wrote no chapter on the self or anything like it.

Atomism and a vigorous positivism converged in the work of Watson (1913, 1925) who identified the basic elements of human life with empirically observable phenomena—environmental stimuli and behavioral responses. Bolstered by the striking theoretical justification of logical positivism, a behavioral revolution occurred in American psychology during the 1930s and dominated the field for at least 30 years.

1.2. The “new psychology” of the whole human

It was into this sociohistorical milieu that Gordon Allport (1937), Henry Murray (1938), Ross Stagner (1937) and other early personality psychologists were nurtured and to which they desired to contribute. Allport, for example—influenced by holistic currents in European psychology—made the psychological study of the whole human his life’s work and sought to legitimate this focus of study (Nicholson, 2003). To do so, he had to address the atomistic pressures in his discipline moving in the opposite direction. However, by this time, the assumptions of positivism had so permeated the plausibility structures of modern psychology, his own understanding of the study of the whole human and his advocacy of the same necessarily conformed to and expressed positivist norms.

As a result, Allport had to justify the study of the whole human and anticipate the concerns of the elementalists and environmentalists, but to do so in ways that satisfied the rigid requirements of positivism regarding what constituted knowledge. Consequently, he (and others) settled on the most objective term available at that time—the “3rd person” construct of “personality”—as the preferred label of the whole human, in contrast to other

more subjective terms that were also available (Nicholson, 2003³). For example, he consciously discarded *character* from psychology, because it was an ethical concept (1937, 1961),⁴ as well as the self considered as a *subject* or *human agent* (1961, pp. 129–130), since neither fit within a true *science* of the whole human being. However, self as an object (including self-awareness, self-knowledge, and self-feeling) was allowed in, since it was amenable to (admittedly introspective) observation. Even so, it was given secondary status (compared to personality) and the scientific-sounding, Latinate name *proprium* (perhaps because of its inherently subjective nature) (see 1961, pp. 110–128).

Moreover, by focusing on personality *traits*, the qualms of both atomism and positivism could be put to rest, since traits were the elements of personality and much progress had been made empirically identifying and measuring these individual differences (Barenbaum & Winter, 2010). Personality was simply one of many areas of psychological study that were radically reshaped by the epistemological requirements of positivism and atomism, bolstered by the powerful methods of the natural sciences that were being applied to new aspects of human nature, influences that continued implicitly to constrain the trajectory of the study of the whole human throughout most of the 20th century.

1.3. Later personality developments

There were, of course, other influences on the field. As in other areas of psychology, Freud’s clinical theorizing had a significant impact. His tripartite model of id, ego, and superego was recognized as an important model of the major components of the personality. And after Freud died, the psychoanalytic school he founded began focusing more attention on the ego and its development. Characterized by self-awareness and purpose (and therefore somewhat analogous to the notion of the self as subject, but in contrast to personality), the ego exists in consciousness, and possesses attention, memory, and reasoning ability, as well as defense mechanisms (structures of self-deception). Freud’s theories profoundly affected the work of Henry Murray (1938), who made human motives the fundamental element of his study of personality. His more interpretive or qualitative methods of documentation, however, kept his theories from being widely embraced by the mainstream research community, at least until the more quantitative studies of achievement motivation were done in the 50s and 60s.

In the latter half of the century, the self reemerged as a viable candidate as the model of the whole human. Humanistic theory and psychotherapy reemphasized the self and made it central to its model of optimal human life (Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1961). Later, social cognitive

³ “One of the major reasons for proposing the category was its apparent objectivity. It was thought to provide psychologists with a morally neutral way for talking about the totality of human experience.” (p. 8)

⁴ “...the psychologist does not need the term at all; personality alone will serve. *Character is personality evaluated, and personality is character devaluated*” (Allport, 1937, p. 52, italics his).

researchers also came to recognize the self's importance in human functioning (Bandura, 1997; Baumeister, 1999; Buss, 2001; Harter, 1999). During the same time, object relations and especially self theorists likewise began factoring in the self to their theory and practice, along with the ego (Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1977).

Around the same time that humanistic psychotherapy was coming to prominence, Hall and Lindzey (1957) wrote a new kind of personality textbook that consolidated many of the related but diverse contributions in the field made over the previous 30 years; thus forming a set of “grand theories of personality,” and thereby helping to structure this growing subdiscipline and forming an easily transmissible course of study. Models of personality traits continued to develop (Cattell, 1957; Leary, 1957; McCrae & Costa, 1987; Myers, 1962), as well as rigorous molecular and environmentalist models of personality, in which the validity of trait descriptions of the whole human were questioned (e.g., Mischel, 1973). These literatures too were easily engrafted into the conceptually conservative framework of the “grand theories” (e.g., Aiken, 1993; Peterson, 1988). More recently, widespread interest in the significance of narrative in human life has led to a relatively novel (and notable) approach to studying the whole human from the standpoint of one's story (McAdams, 1985, 1993, 2008a).

This brief summary, of course, does not do justice to the complex history of modern personality psychology (see Barenbaum & Winter, 2010; McAdams, 1997). Our purpose is rather to ask if, in retrospect, this diversity should have been pressed into the single mold of “personality.” Perhaps this 70-year-old preference is more an artifact of history than the best label for a science of the whole human? Is there an empirical and conceptual necessity for placing the entire museum of the whole human in the one hall of personality? For example, if personality actually refers to something other than what the self is or does, then perhaps the traditional organization results in a loss of terminological and conceptual precision and clarity, creating serious problems for a science that aims at an accurate description of the object of its empirical inquiry and ultimately compromising some of its validity.

Ironically, given its name, positive psychology has done more to overturn the distorting effects of positivism than any other countervailing force in modern psychology. Reflecting changes that have occurred in contemporary philosophy of science and epistemology, psychological topics that before were relegated to philosophy and theology – virtues like courage, patience, and wisdom – have been subjected to a more generous empiricism than was before permitted (though not without criticism) and have been found to be verifiable. As a result, perhaps today we can perceive things that Allport, Murray, and Stagner could not. Indeed, perhaps we are now in a position to question the potential distortions of positivism that have affected modern personality psychology. More importantly, perhaps there is a better way conceptually to organize the field of the study of the whole human that would lead to a more comprehensive scientific subdiscipline.

2. The concept of form

Instead of fitting all relevant information into a single categorical perspective on the whole human, let us move up one level of categorization in order to obtain a more general and abstract concept within which to fit all the valid, distinct perspectives on the whole human. This higher-order concept will be termed *form*.

The notion of form has an ancient heritage in Western thought. Plato used the Greek term *eidos*—translated as either Form or Idea—to refer to eternal, immaterial, universal concepts like whiteness, beauty, intelligence, which he considered to be the perfect, transcendent exemplars of the actual temporal and imperfect instantiations of these concepts that we discover around us in this world. Aristotle rejected the idealistic metaphysics of Plato's conception, and argued instead that every substance is composed of both matter and form. Matter is the “stuff” of a particular thing and form is what that thing shares in common with other similar things. The soul, he believed, was the *form* of the *matter* of the body for a particular individual. But for both Aristotle and Plato, form was identified with a thing's essence. Many centuries later, Thomas Aquinas, along with others in the Catholic tradition, accepted Aristotle's understanding of form and his designation of the soul as the form of the body.

According to the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, in our day *form* can mean “visible shape or configuration” as well as “the essential nature of a species or thing.” Among its synonyms are whole, structure, schema, pattern, and configuration, as well as a German term familiar in the history of modern psychology, *gestalt*.

2.1. The psychological form

How might this term help us in a scientific psychology? A form is a particular pattern or configuration. So the term could be used as a label for the general category of the sets of psychological patterns or configurations of the whole individual human being: personality, self, ego, narrative, and character, and so on. A psychological form, then, would be a molar pattern or configuration of a set of dynamic psychological features, viewed from a certain vantage point, a distinct model of the whole human individual, requiring a particular interpretive stance for its pattern to be seen. Such forms are analogous to perceptual *gestalts*, organized by the perceiving subject, as were studied by the early *gestalt* psychologists. Such *gestalt* perception is a “gathering together” of elements of a perceptual display into a particular whole.

Two related considerations favor a change of label for the subdiscipline of the whole human. The first is a matter of hierarchical conceptual relations: *personality* is properly understood as a subcategory (or “species”) of a more general concept (or “genus”). The second has to do with the respective extension or reference of the terms in question. Whereas *personality* refers to one (or at most, two) distinct models of the whole human, the term *form* can aptly refer to all valid models. As a result, the term *form* may be a less distorting label for a field of the whole human than

a single-perspective label that subsumes all other perspectives within itself.

It is very important to distinguish this use of the term “form” from those of Plato or Aristotle. Whereas they were referring to a metaphysical entity, form is being used here to refer to any of a number of valid particular configurations of the psychological features of the whole human. So it is not being suggested that humans are composed of multiple, discrete, metaphysical entities or parts. A psychological form is simply a particular configuration of the whole human, a molar template by which one can perceive a set of psychological features of human beings holistically. Indeed, viewing the whole human as any single form invariably leaves out some of its features. But ideally all the forms studied in a form psychology should together include the most important psychological features of the whole human.⁵ At the same time, a form psychology would not necessitate a functionalist or anti-realist epistemology (though it would seem to be compatible with either). With a form orientation, one can still affirm the actual existence of the identified psychological features (science at least implicitly assumes such a stance), as well as the *meaningfulness* of the forms, while denying that the forms are themselves distinct entities (this assertion will make more sense below). Instead, the goal of a form psychology would be a thorough description of the existent object of the subdiscipline: the one whole human, understood as comprehensively as possible—the referent of the forms, the “pluriform,” if you will.

Let us consider an analogy. Thematic cartography is the branch of map-making that develops maps that have distinct themes for different audiences and purposes (Dent, Torguson, & Hodler, 2008). For example, a set of thematic maps of a region could include maps of its counties, towns, and highways; elevation (topographic); population density and socioeconomic status of the inhabitants; and ecosystems. Nowadays there are maps of many different physical objects, including the human body and human brain. Collections of different maps of certain categories of objects are called atlases. Let us then liken the forms to various “thematic maps” of the whole immaterial aspect of the individual human being, but instead of graphical, multi-color representations, each is represented in discourse.

This metaphor works well, for the thematic maps themselves are obviously distinct from the object of which they are representations. Similarly, the various forms (or holistic perspectives) of a human being have to be distinguished from the individual him or herself. Each form is a particular configuration of descriptive information about an individual arranged for a specific epistemological

purpose. Each is a “way of seeing” the whole, individual, immaterial human being.⁶

Perhaps the greatest liability of the term “form” is that its common usage seems to imply something static—a physical form of a person, like a statue, is comparatively unchanging. One can make the same complaint about scientific models, of course, even though models of dynamic systems have been developed (e.g., the kinetic theory of gases). The problem here is that change is an additional order of complexity in reality, and therefore it is always more difficult to represent conceptually. As a result, we will continually have to remind ourselves that, like the humans they represent, their respective psychological forms are also temporal and dynamic: they develop; they are in process; they usually increase in complexity over time, especially through childhood and adolescence; and they exist in relation to other forms. Therefore, the forms of a form psychology must be considered “dynamic structures,” which are continuously being modified. Staying with the map metaphor, forms can be likened to different thematic “video maps” of a land mass over time representing, for example, cultural, geological, population, and ecological changes from Time¹ to Time².

Another problem with the concept of “form” is its abstract connotations. Form is one of the most general of concepts in any language. However, as we will see below, when applied to individual human beings it refers to something that is fundamentally particular, existential, and the epitome of personal. In spite of its limitations, the term form is deemed the best available signifier for the objects of interest.

2.1.1. *Perspectival realism*

Some might consider the different forms to be mutually exclusive and treat them either as intellectual competitors—in which one is correct and the others false—or as fundamentally contradictory to each other, so that they actually demonstrate that it is not possible to know the whole person. A more dialogical approach is to think of the various forms altogether as giving a more comprehensive understanding of the whole person, than any one form would by itself. “Perspectival realism” (Giere, 1999; Rueger, 2005) is a framework in the philosophy of science built upon this epistemic possibility. It maintains that there can be sufficient evidence to demonstrate that more than one model fits the relevant data, and lead to the valid conclusion that each perspective contributes to a fuller, more accurate understanding. Findings in physics, for example,

⁵ This is not meant to suggest that the form-constructs are arbitrary. The goal of every science is knowledge of an object. The philosophy of science assumed in this article is realist. A human being and its psychological features are considered to be actual, metaphysical entities, and each form is a representation of some of those actualities. At the same time, the representation ought not to be equated with the object which it represents. *Humans* exist and the author assumes that mature humans consist of the psychological features that are being aggregated in various combinations/configurations.

⁶ A couple of other metaphors may also illustrate. The roles that a person takes—mother, wife, employee, supervisor, neighbor—can be analogous to the forms of a human being: multiple roles describe the one person. A second metaphor is a “photograph.” In order to obtain the most comprehensive visual representation of a spectacular mountain, for example, different photographers could be positioned at different locations around the mountain, where they would be able to capture different features of the mountain, leading to a set of distinct, but all valid, perspectives of the same object. The most comprehensive representation of that mountain would be the set of photographs, not just one perspective. Moreover, the set of photographs could be used to make a three-dimensional representation (corresponding to the pluriform).

regarding the nature of light as wave and as particle have led to this framework. Psychological forms could be similar.

3. A survey of major psychological forms

There are a number of candidates of forms that could be discussed. The following list is by no means definitive, but it includes most of the important forms that have been identified in Western intellectual thought and psychological research up to the present.⁷ Unfortunately, to explain each of the forms included in this discussion enough to justify its inclusion, together with the earlier lengthy section on the conceptual background of personality psychology, will make this article unusually long.

3.1. Personality architecture

We begin with personality, somewhat out of deference to the contributions of modern psychology in the 20th century. However, as the subject developed, two broadly contrasting approaches to personality arose (Allport, 1937⁸; Barenbaum & Winter, 2010; Cervone, 2005; Pervin, 2000), which will be labeled here *personality architecture* and *personality signature*. According to Cervone, personality architecture refers to “within-person personality structures and processes” (2004, p. 183) and “the overall design and operating characteristics of intra-individual personality systems” (2005, p. 423).

Cervone (2004, 2005) has focused on molecular kinds of dynamic structures: cognitive and affective units (systems, variables, mechanism, p. 184) that compose what he terms knowledge and appraisal personality architecture.⁹ However, there are no necessary reasons to limit the use of that term to his particular model, as valuable as it is, and to a more molecular analysis. By contrast, Mayer (2005), for example, similarly understands the major goal of personality psychology to be the “combination of major psychological systems” (p. 294; see also Allport, 1937; Mayer, 1993). “Personality psychology ... studies how psychological systems are organized into a whole” (Mayer, 2005, p. 294). Reflecting an agenda present throughout the 20th century, Mayer considers the aim of personality psychology to be to “collect and categorize the most important parts of the personality,” including “the system’s relatively long-

term structure and chief dynamic functions” (p. 296). Mayer, we could say, offers a *molar* model of personality architecture (though he himself did not use the term).¹⁰ Both molecular (or elemental) and molar (or modular) standpoints would seem to be essential to a comprehensive model of personality architecture.

Freud was one of the first modern psychologists to propose a molar model, in fact, he proposed two: first, a rather simple one, focusing on the human capacity for self-awareness, and composed of the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious; and a little later he developed a slightly more complex tripartite model of personality made up of id, ego, and superego. Freud’s two models, of course, have been very influential, but in retrospect, they were both too simple.

Over the 20th century many other significant psychological substructures have been identified. Today we might include sensation and perceptual systems, attention and consciousness systems, a motor system, a working memory system, long-term memory-systems (explicit [semantic and episodic] and implicit), the emotion system (composed of subsystems responsible for the basic emotions), the language system (and its subsystems: vocabulary, grammar, language comprehension, and language expression), intelligence subsystems (e.g., reasoning, visual intelligence, and problem-solving), the volitional system, creativity and imagination systems, the music system, the mathematical system, defense mechanisms, the conscience, a spirituality module, as well as the many automatic mental systems that exist, like the executive (see Anderson et al., 2004; Ashcraft, 2005; d’Aquila & Newberg, 1999; Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2008; Mayer, 2005).

The larger subcomponents of personality architecture have been termed “modules” by some (Anderson et al., 2004; Buss, 2007; Fodor, 1983; Gazzaniga et al., 2008). Modules are considered to be genetically-derived and brain-based psychological subsystems that emerge through and are shaped by social experience and that have specific functions. More fine-grained analyses would also yield numerous intermediate psychological dynamic structures that are more context dependent (see Mayer, 2005, for a discussion of some of these). We might liken the study of personality architecture in psychology to human anatomy in biology and medicine.

3.1.1. Modular reservations

Some personality theorists question the existence of modules (along with others in the broader field of psychology), arguing that the most advanced regions of the brain are characterized by “domain-general processing mechanisms” that can be applied to a wide variety of tasks

⁷ In order to summarize a number of forms, we do not have enough space to go beyond a brief discussion, since each one has many complex aspects (e.g., its development, and the features or elements of which it is composed).

⁸ Allport (1937) early on distinguished between nomothetic and idiographic approaches to personality, which corresponds broadly to the distinction being made here.

⁹ Assuming a similar theoretical orientation (social cognitive), Mischel and Shoda (1995) and Mischel et al. (2004) refer to the whole human as the “personality system” (pp. 417–419). In the latter work, the authors suggest this system is composed of traits, motives, appraisals, expectancies, self-concepts, affects, defenses, and self-regulatory processes. However, it will be suggested in this article that, rather than using one construct for *everything* relevant to the whole human, including phenomena that seem categorically different (e.g., traits, beliefs, and self-concepts), the recognition of multiple forms provides a more adequate way to organize such complexity.

¹⁰ Mayer’s is an ambitious model, utilizing a systems-approach which is able to encompass phenomena that are hierarchically arranged at different levels of interdependent complexity. And it might be supposed that such a model could include *all* the facets of the whole human. However, it cannot, because a systems-approach is itself based in a cybernetic, rather than a personalistic framework, and therefore is necessarily unable to address some of the highest features of human beings, like personal agency and moral responsibility, and it is difficult to see how a systems-approach could do justice to narrative.

(Cervone & Mischel, 2002, p. 8). Research on the brain has also found that many complex activities and tasks involve multiple regions that are pervasively interconnected and interdependent (e.g., creativity and problem-solving), suggesting that “module” may be a fuzzy category, more appropriate in some cases than in others. Even among those who affirm them, there is no agreement regarding their nature, number, and boundaries between them, so a definitive list of personality architecture modules may be impossible. This debate demonstrates the dynamic nature of even this seemingly most stable of forms. Nonetheless, there would seem to be enough neurological and psychological evidence to warrant using the term module as a useful lexical marker the sum of which constitutes personality architecture, at least with regard to the most clearly demarcated psychological functions, with the perennial proviso that more research is needed.

3.2. Personality signature

“Personality *signature*” refers to an individual’s relatively unique configuration of cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and relational dispositions that are relatively stable across situations and over time and that tend to distinguish one individual from others (which, together with others in the population, form between-person personality taxonomies, Cervone, 2005). In contrast to personality architecture (the dynamic structures of which all normal humans are presumed to have in common), personality signature is more idiographic or person-specific, and refers to a particular individual’s set of traits, attitudes, habits, or dispositions that explain the consistency we observe in people. Every mature human, it is commonly said, has a certain “personality.” McAdams and Pals (2006) has referred to this view of the personality as an individual’s “dispositional signature.”

The elements that make up one’s signature have most often been termed traits in modern psychology, and many instruments have been developed for assessing various traits—each based on a particular taxonomy, derived from a specific research program, and that give a “personality profile” of an individual according to the taxonomy. A valid profile offers a particular view of an individual’s signature.¹¹

Probably more scientific work was done in the 20th century developing this form than any other. Along with intelligence, the extensive study of personality signature contributed significantly to the study of individual differences and the refinement of appropriate measurement methods and tools. An individual’s signature is described

¹¹ Interactionists have made great strides in specifying more carefully the situation-specific nature of the activation of dispositions (Cervone, 2004; Mischel, 1973; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Mischel et al., 2004). Mischel and Shoda (1995) have referred to these situated dispositions themselves as “if...then behavioral signatures” (see also Kamrath, Mendoza-Denton, & Mischel, 2005). According to this usage, the term signature labels a more molecular idiographic phenomena, analogous to a trait, and a person could have many behavioral signatures, rather than one overall personality signature. I have no objection to the former use. However, McAdams’ notion of signature corresponds nicely to a form.

by measuring some set of personality traits, which are usually thought to exist on a continuum and to be relatively free of ethical implications (which distinguishes them from *character* traits, see below). The dominant model of personality signature currently is the “five-factor” model, due to its focus on the five traits for which there is especially robust research evidence: extroversion–introversion, agreeableness–disagreeableness, conscientiousness–careless, emotional stability–lability, and openness to experience–closedness to experience (McCrae & Costa, 1987, 2008). Other important models have included Eysenck’s two-type model, the Myers–Briggs scale based on Jung’s taxonomy, Cattell’s 16PF, and many others. Research has found that the personality signature has some stability over the lifespan, but it is also constantly changing, depending on its contexts, goals, and story (Cervone, 2004; McCrae & Costa, 2008).

3.3. The self as object or self-representation

The self is another map of the whole human that has developed an increasingly large research base, and that to some extent now competes with personality as the primary form discussed within contemporary psychology (Leary & Tangney, 2003).¹² Arguably, the self was the first form identified in modern American psychology, since William James (1890)—its “pioneer” (Boring, 1950, p. 508)—spent a chapter on it in his magnum opus, 40 years before personality would eclipse it as the favored model in the field. Along with person and ego, the self had had significant currency in the philosophical literature of the previous two centuries, in contrast with personality. Of the available candidates, it was James’ opinion that the self was the most empirical, perhaps because at that time the report of the contents of one’s consciousness was considered a legitimate research method.

The concept of the self fell out of favor as behaviorism (and positivism) grew in influence. However, as mentioned above, it retained a modest place in Allport’s system (1937, 1961), surfacing increasingly in the latter half of the 20th century (Stagner, 1974; Wylie, 1961), eventually becoming a major theme in personality psychology (Baumeister, 1987; Buss, 2001; Pervin, 1996).

One of the important distinctions James made was that between the I-self (the knowing, agentic self; the self as subject) and the Me-self (all that one knows about oneself, the self as Object). Many others have since endorsed this fundamental dichotomy (see Baumeister, 1999; Damon & Hart, 1988; Harter, 1999; McAdams, 2008b; Mischel, Shoda, & Smith, 2004; Robins, Tracy, & Trzesniewski, 2008; Stagner, 1974). However, this presents us with something of a terminological controversy, because the poles of this subject–object dichotomy of the self are so different, that each would seem to constitute a distinct

¹² At least since Allport (1937), the self has usually been subsumed under personality (see Part V in John, Robins, & Pervin, 2008; and Part VII in Hogan, Johnson, & Briggs). However, today some theorists argue for the need to more sharply distinguish the self from person and personality, as is being suggested here (e.g., Leary & Tangney, 2003; Robins, Tracy, & Trzesniewski, 2008).

perspective or map of the whole human. Complicating the discussion is the fact that significant philosophical work on the self has been done over the past couple of centuries in the West, particularly the I-self, with different thinkers in different times using various terms for it (soul, rational being, person, transcendent ego, personal agent, and human agent, as well as self). With such a complex terminological provenance, any decision regarding labels will be questioned. Nevertheless, to help us keep straight these two poles of the self, the term “self-representation” will be favored for the Me-self and “personal agent” will be used for the I-self.

In this section, we consider the “self-representation,” the object of one’s knowledge and evaluation, the dynamic sum of the affect-laden beliefs one has of oneself. It goes by many other names as well: self-concept (Shavelson & Bolus, 1982; Wylie, 1961), self-theory (Dweck, 2000), or self-system (Dweck, Higgins, & Grant-Pillow, 2003), and includes the set of one’s current beliefs about oneself (or self-schemata; Markus, 1977), goals or personal strivings, and self-evaluations (which activate self-conscious emotions that come to be attached to specific self-beliefs, resulting in what is commonly called self-esteem).

3.4. *The self as subject or personal agent*

As already mentioned, different thinkers and intellectual communities have used many different terms for this form. Some have simply used the *self* (Kierkegaard, 1849/1980b; Taylor, 1989), as well as other self-related terms: the “self as subject,” the I-self (Harter, 1999; James, 1890), the self as agent (Macmurray, 1957), the moral self (Bandura, 2002), the self as experiencing subject and executive agent (Leary & Tangney, 2003), and Westen (1992) has written of one’s *sense of self* (Westen, 1992). Within the psychoanalytic tradition, the term *ego* was used.¹³ Other terms in this family include agent (Martin, Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003), human agent (Taylor, 1985), and moral agent (Bandura, 2002), the person (Harré, 1984, 1998), and origin (deCharms, 1968).¹⁴ Consequently, there is currently no universally agreed-upon label for this form.¹⁵ In this article, this form will be called *personal agent*.

Over the centuries, important work on this model was done by philosophers and theologians. At the founding of modern psychology, some investigators turned their

attention to action and volition (e.g., Baldwin, 1891; Brentano’s, 1969, “act psychology;” Ach’s work at Würzburg; see Boring, 1950). However, with the rise of positivism, such topics were soon exorcised from American psychology, because of their allegedly non-empirically verifiable nature. As a result, for most of the 20th century, the rules of mainstream psychological discourse only allowed reference to deterministic, “extrapersonal” influences on human behavior (biological and social). Humanistic psychotherapy and personality theory arose and challenged these restraints and promoted distinctly agentic perspectives (Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1961). However, positivism was by no means dead, and mainstream researchers raised too many concerns about the quality and claims of this research and its influence faded. Improved research on the self, more sensitive to positivist concerns, nonetheless continued to describe aspects of the self’s agency, and began implicitly softening positivist restrictions from within, exploring, for example, self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997) and self-determination (Deci & Ryan, 1985). In the past two decades, this broadened into explicit discussions and investigations of *human agent* causation within mainstream psychology (Baer, Kaufman, & Baumeister, 2008; Bandura, 1989, 1999, 2001, 2002; Baumeister, Mele, & Vohs, 2010; Deci & Ryan, 2002; Martin et al., 2003). Similarly, during the same time, action began competing with behavior as the favored way to perceive what people do (see e.g., Brandstädter, 1998; Cranach & Harré, 1982; Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Kühl & Beckmann, 1994; Stern, 1985; Wertsch, 1998).¹⁶

This section is longer than the others, because the notion of a personal agent remains controversial and highly contested (see Churchland, 1995; Dennett, 1984; Wegner, 2002). Nevertheless, a sufficient number of philosophers, theologians, and psychologists exists to warrant its consideration as a form. Personal agents are believed to have unique characteristics that distinguish them from non-humans. Accounts vary, but personal agent criteria generally include some or most of the following set of interdependent capacities: properly functioning complex memory-systems; a relatively high level of self-consciousness (compared with other higher mammals; see Robins, Tracy, & Trzesniewski, 2008), including awareness of the future and of other humans and their thoughts, feelings, and actions (a well-developed “theory of mind”); a capacity for reflexivity (the ability to reflect upon oneself and one’s own thoughts, feelings, and actions) (Bandura, 2001; Baumeister, 1999; Kierkegaard, 1844/1980a, 1849/1980b); a relatively sophisticated use of language and rationality (compared with children), such that one is able to discern meaning, and evaluate desires and formulate goals, plans, personal strivings, and reasons for performing actions accordingly (Frankfurt, 1971; Taylor, 1985); and abilities to form complex intentions, make decisions, self-regulate, and carry out intentions in action, with varying degrees of effort or willpower (Bandura, 2001; Mischel,

¹³ For example, Hauser (2000) writes that the psychoanalytic ego represents, “the individual as an active agent with his or her own independent interests...” (p. 143).

¹⁴ The above terms, of course, are not mere synonyms. They are used within distinct frames of reference and highlight different aspects of the whole human. Nonetheless, they have a family resemblance and refer to a recognizable map of whole, mature human being.

¹⁵ Or, for that matter, the set of processes that distinguish it: agency (Bakan, 1966; McAdams, 1993); human agency (Taylor, 1985); situated, emergent, and deliberative agency (Martin et al., 2003); personal agency and moral agency (Bandura, 2001; Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001); personal causation (deCharms, 1968); self-determination (Deci & Ryan, 2002); willpower (Mischel, 1996); volition (Kühl & Beckmann, 1994); and freedom of will (Cloninger, 2003; Howard, 1994).

¹⁶ It should be admitted that most psychologists in this area have tended to focus on action, and resisted making claims about the human doing the acting—but this too has been changing.

1996), and imaginatively project themselves into the future and generate novel courses of action, including unique human products, like technical or artistic objects. Martin et al. (2003) provide a good summary statement: “human agency is the deliberative, reflective activity of a human being in framing, choosing, and executing his or her actions in a way that is not fully determined by factors and conditions other than his or her own understanding and reasoning” (p. 82).¹⁷

Given the above capacities, personal agents are also considered moral agents who act in light of an awareness of moral standards and possess a sense of responsibility for their decisions and actions, and likewise tend to be held accountable for them by others, judgments that can be altered by mitigating circumstances (Weiner, 1995, 2005). Moral agency also involves moral emotions (Haidt, 2003; Kierkegaard, 1844/1980a, 1849/1980b) and a sign of mature personal agency is the activation of one’s conscience upon violating a significant personal norm (Grusec, 2006), irrespective of the awareness of others of the violation. The transgression of moral norms produces emotions of guilt in oneself and anger in others (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Weiner, 1995). It is commonly recognized in complex cultures that mature personal agents are to be held responsible for themselves and their actions. The field of jurisprudence is based on such a notion of personal agency, and courts are mandated by their societies to determine whether the accused did the violating deed with which they are charged, and if so, whether they were in fact full personal agents when it was committed (indicated by such factors as intentionality and premeditation).

Two features then would seem to be at the heart of this form. First is the basic and universal sense humans have that they are the origins of their own actions, and the second follows from the first, that they are therefore more or less responsible for them. As Taylor (1985, 1989) has argued, a science of human beings has the task of taking seriously humanity’s own self-understanding in its models of human nature, even as other factors are taken into account. “What we need to *explain* is people living their lives” (Taylor, 1989, p. 58). Without such a willingness to listen to “the agents themselves,” our science’s description of the whole human would seem to be partial, if not distorted.

3.4.1. Situated agency

Twentieth-century psychology’s major contribution to these considerations has been its descriptions of the biological and social factors that make possible the emergence of personal agency and in some cases compromise it. Personal agency is always situated, that is, it is influenced by, emerges from, and engages extrapersonal states of affairs (Bandura, 2001; Martin et al., 2003); so agency is not absolutely free (à la Sartre). On the contrary, it is necessarily conditioned by its being embodied, and constrained by the limitations of

the physical universe, the contexts of one’s relationships and culture, and one’s developmental history.

Personal agents possess the dynamic human capacity of personal agency—active, reactive, and interactive with other personal agents. The form is like the form of dancing, and after it emerges, its powers can wax and wane, depending on a host of agentic and extrapersonal factors (Bickhard, 2012).

3.5. Character

Since at least Aristotle, character has figured prominently in considerations of the whole human in Western thought, so it is no surprise that the majority of work done on this model has been done by philosophers. As with the previous form, modern psychology arose out of the philosophical roots that it was seeking to transcend, so some of its earliest works made reference to character. In a chapter on volition, Baldwin (1891), for example, described the process of character development through individual choices, shaped by genetic endowment and the social environment (a description not far from Aristotle’s own). By the 1920s the term character was still being used, but a “scientific approach” had largely freed the concept from moral and religious considerations (see Hartshorne & May, 1930; Jastrow, 1921; Roback, 1928).¹⁸ However, the growing influence of logical positivism pushed even this truncated understanding of character out of the field of psychology (with only a few exceptions¹⁹). For example, Allport (1937) concluded that character is an “ethical concept,” because it is only used in evaluation, when “personal effort is judged from the standpoint of some code” (p. 51), making it inappropriate, he thought, for a true science of the whole human. As a result, the study of

¹⁸ As Roback (1928) opined: “Character need not be envisaged in a moral sense,” and “A man of character [simply]...possesses the strength of inhibiting his individual tendencies...” (p. 160). The goal of character study is “the consideration of human traits as natural realities, as significant issues of natural processes,” “primarily as functions of the nervous system,” shaped by heredity and the environment, “the two mighty shapers of human quality” (Jastrow, 1921, p. 8). Hartshorne and May (1930) conducted a widely publicized study on character (examining deception, service, and self-control among children), in which they concluded that educators should be less concerned with inculcating moral “traits,” than reconstructing the social situation, which largely determined moral behavior. In their volume on deception, they remark, “No one is honest, or dishonest by ‘nature.’ Where conflict arises between a child and his environment, deception is a natural mode of adjustment, having in itself no ‘moral’ significance. If indirect ways of gaining his ends are successful, they will be continued unless definite training is undertaken through which direct and honest methods may also become successful.” (Vol. 1, p. 412). These authors are simply reflecting the positivist spirit then dominant in the field.

¹⁹ For example, psychoanalytic and psychiatric literature continued to use the term character to describe rigid pathological patterns of thought, emotion, and behavior (including the defenses), but eventually these patterns came to be called *personality disorders*. See e.g., Josephs, 1992; Reich, 1945. Stagner (1974) provides a fairly recent exception to the rule, devoting an entire chapter to character in his personality text (chap. 10), where he considered subjects like sociopathy, criminality, sharing, and conscience, similar to the focus of the 1920s. Notably, he did not consider character to be a unified personality structure (a form), but rather “a set of unrelated habits” (p. 273).

¹⁷ Shaffer (2005) more simply defines human agency as “The recognition that one can be the cause of an event or events” (p. 165).

moral character was essentially removed from the discipline for nearly 50 years.

Over the last few decades, significant investigations of moral development arose, exploring its causal influences, rationality, and associated phenomena (e.g., Damon, 1988; Hoffman, 2000; Killen & Smetana, 2006; Kohlberg, 1984). Nonetheless, the specter of positivism was still being felt, evident in the common reference to *social* standards rather than transcendent moral standards.²⁰ The positive psychology revolution has more recently reintroduced character back into psychology, and has begun investigating its virtues or strengths, analogous to the study of traits examined in personality psychology (Peterson & Seligman, 2004, pp. 10–12). Nonetheless, little consideration has been given, as of yet, to character as a whole, as a form *per se*. Because Western philosophers over the centuries devoted significant attention to moral character and virtue and vice, some reference to their work will be necessary.

Character is the thematic map of the whole person considered as an *ethical* being. Character is an individual's form viewed with respect to good and evil. "A person's character is a group of relatively stable traits connected with practical choice and action. These traits...are usually taken to involve a complex interweaving of beliefs, motivational desires, and emotional responses." (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 200). The traits are dichotomous, called virtues and vices, which are dispositions to good and to evil respectively, and which have been the primary object of focus in this area (especially the virtues). Our focus in this article, however, is on the whole human. Character, then, includes an individual's overall pattern of dispositions (virtues and vices) that pertain to living ethically, along with the actions of the moral life situated within their social and narrative contexts.

This definition does not take us far enough, however, for it does not address the source of one's understanding of ethical living. A major trend in Western ethical thought, ancient and recently revived, defines living ethically as living for that which is most praiseworthy and valuable in human life, the pursuit of which constitutes the flourishing and moral excellence of a human being (Adams, 1999; Aristotle, 1985; Murdoch, 1967; Taylor, 1989). According to Aristotle, the father of virtue ethics in the West, the highest good in human life is happiness, wellbeing, or blessedness (*eudaimonia*), and true wellbeing is realized only in a life in which one's potentials for excellence are being realized, the foremost of which is one's virtuous character (Miller, 2003; Zagzebski, 2004). Given these assumptions, one's character

can also be seen to have a teleological dimension, and its unity would seem to increase as more and more of one's potential for virtue is realized.²¹

Like aspects of some other forms, the character of individuals would seem to lie along a continuum. Moral saints are those whose character is distinguished by substantial (though not perfect) moral integrity—a thorough and consistent moral excellence—those who are "as morally worthy as can be" (Wolf, 1982, p. 419). Immoral persons, by contrast, are those whose character is typified by substantial moral depravity (though also not absolute). Most persons would seem to fall somewhere between the extremes, and as with personality signature, there is great cross-situational variance.

Peterson and Seligman (2004) have developed a classification scheme for virtues (and their component character strengths) and have begun documenting their empirical evidence, including strengths of wisdom and knowledge, courage, humanity (love, kindness, social intelligence), justice, temperance, and transcendence (gratitude, hope, humor, and spirituality). Positive psychology, by definition, focuses on the good side of character. However, similar empirical investigations have begun for its bad side as well (e.g., envy, Smith & Kim, 2007; procrastination, Steel, 2007), perhaps leading eventually to something like a DSM of the vices (and perhaps a "negative psychology"?).

3.5.1. *The development of character*

Personal agency would seem to be a prerequisite for the development of character, since the capacities of personal agency make possible the actions that lead to ethical character formation in either direction (Aristotle, 1985). However, people are most interested in the development of virtue. Indeed, this has been one of the grand motives of Western ethical thought since ancient times.

We might begin by acknowledging how fraught this area is with self-deception and self-serving bias. Humans tend to be fairly idealistic regarding morality, yet quick to justify their own evil actions and those of their group, and at least Westerners are apt to attribute others' behavior to dispositional rather than situational causes (Augustinos, Walker, & Donaghue, 2006; Baumeister, 1999).

Developmental psychologists have explored many of the causal antecedents to adult ethical behavior and have found that caregiver abuse, neglect, negativity, and coercion; parent conflict; as well as biological and cultural influences can dispose children to immoral and irresponsible behavior in adolescence and adulthood. Conversely, supportive, empathic, and firm caregiving, within an overall atmosphere of positive affect; modeling of altruism; caregiver inductions and expression of disappointment in response to misbehavior; recognition of the child's increasing agency; and promotion of appropriate self-conscious emotions lead to later prosocial behavior (Coie

²⁰ Kohlberg was of course a notable exception. Why social? Because there is plenty of empirical evidence of the influence of socialization on many of the particulars of moral development. But one could argue (as Chomsky did regarding language) for an underlying moral grammar that is biologically-based. There is also the virtual universality of the most important moral principles (e.g., the reciprocity norm and prohibitions against random acts of violence). The influence of positivism can also be seen in the modern psychology preference for terms that tend to lack ethical and evaluative connotations, like "warmth," "prosocial behavior," "altruism," "power-assertive discipline," and "aggression," which thereby "distance" the discourse from everyday discourse, which is so often more ethically charged.

²¹ Perhaps it should be pointed out that positive psychology was initially hindered by previous research on happiness that focused on subjective wellbeing—simply feeling happy. Increasingly, positive psychologists have begun the process of thinking more carefully about positivity, leading to discriminations between pleasure and virtue (e.g., Franklin, 2010).

& Dodge, 1998; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Grusec, 2006; Hoffman, 2000; Thompson, Meyer, & McGinley, 2006).

These extrapersonal factors, then, would seem to “set the stage” for the cultivation of virtue and vice upon the emergence of personal agency in adolescence and early adulthood. Contrary to the judgments of a naïve moralism, based on the aforementioned biological and social influences, adolescents become personal agents with ethical dispositions already well established, and it is within the context of these internalized conditions that one’s personal agency builds one’s character.

Character is the ethically-significant, reflexive (self-involved), praiseworthy and blameworthy product of the actions of a personal agent. For example, the practice of virtuous deeds establishes a virtuous character, especially repeated practice in the face of obstacles and suffering. Therefore, a child cannot be virtuous (though well-behaved), and little virtue is possible for a 20-year old. Functions of the care they have received, the actions of children are “simulacra of virtuous actions” (Goldie, 2004, p. 49).

3.5.2. Community-generic and community-specific understandings of character

As documented by positive psychologists and world religion experts, there is a great deal of cross-cultural agreement regarding character. However, the most comprehensive understanding of character will also require the study of the significant between-group differences that exist in how character is articulated and practiced. Such differences are due to conflicting conceptions of human flourishing and human misery and descriptions of the virtues and vices that distinguish each community’s particular understanding and discourse about the Good. Given the vagaries of moral awareness and the fact that moral and character development are both constituted and realized through socialization, such disagreements are inevitable and are evident even in Western intellectual history (MacIntyre, 1984, 1988; Stout, 1988). Consequently, researchers on character have to be mindful of cross-community variety, and resist the typically modern quest for reducing such distinctions to universal common denominators, for such attempts can distort our perception of character as it really exists: situated *within-community*.

3.6. Communion

We turn next to a model that is markedly different from all the others we have considered so far, because it is essentially *social*. Communion is a psychological form that consists of more than one individual. This may seem like an excessive stretch of the definition of the human form. However, the concept of form can be applied to any whole, and all wholes (except absolute elements) are compounds. Consider a perceptual gestalt like six dots on one side of a die—human perception tends to organize them into two groupings of three dots each. Forms are always composed of multiple elements. More importantly, it is widely recognized that the Western emphasis on the individual has been extreme in its own way, and itself a distortion of the actual way humans exist in the world. Strong

relationality (Slife, 2004)—as found in object relations theory, family-systems theory, attachment theory, social constructivism, and dialogism—recognizes that sociality is not an add-on feature of human beings but is essential to our nature. If this is so, then the social relation ought to be considered another psychological map of humanity, one in which $1 + 1 = 1$.

It is well-known that, from Freud on, modern personality theorists have consistently recognized the importance of the social world on the developing personality. Less well-known today are the contemporaneous dialectical insights of the American psychologist J. Mark Baldwin regarding the interdependence of individual and social reality, who argued that the social realm was fundamental to individual human existence.²² Baldwin (1897) referred to the individual as a *socius*, since its being was essentially socially constituted.²³ He wrote that the individual “does not have two lives, two sets of interests, two selves; one personal and the other social. He has but one self, which is personal and social in one, by right of the essential and normal movement of his growth” (1911, p. 28). “The social relation is in all cases *intrinsic to the life, interests, and purposes of the individual*” (pp. 28–29; italics his).

The vigorous individualism of American thought probably prevented this dialectical model of the individual from really taking hold in American psychology, but the role of social relations on the individual have been well documented. The reciprocal interactions between genetic predispositions and social experiences and their influence on personality have been carefully examined (Krueger & Johnson, 2008; Rowe, 1997). Attachment research has focused attention on the impact of the most influential caregivers during the child’s first few years (Fraleigh & Shaver, 2008). The overall role of the family on personality development is well understood (Halverson & Wampler, 1997; Pomerantz & Thompson, 2008). Even one of the factors of the Big Five, agreeableness, concerns the individual’s relational style (McCrae & Costa, 1987). And sophisticated analyses have been conducted on the reciprocal interactions between one’s personality dispositions and current social situations (Cervone, 2004; Funder, 2008; Mischel et al., 2004).

It is especially in research on the self where the influence of social dynamics on the individual has been taken seriously, what Baumeister (1999) calls the self’s “interpersonal being” (p. 7). Mischel and Morf (2003), for example, refer to the self as a ‘psycho-social dynamic processing system,’ and acknowledge it can only be properly understood within its social context. Research on self-handicapping (Higgins, Snyder, & Berglas, 1990), self-presentation (how individuals manage their behavior in

²² See also the work of the early 20th century American sociologists Charles Cooley (1902) and George Herbert Mead (1934).

²³ “The dialectic may be read thus: my thought of self is in the main, as to its character as a personal self, filled up with my thought of others, distributed variously as individuals; and my thought of others, as persons, is mainly filled up with myself. In other words, but for certain minor distinctions in the filling, and for certain compelling distinctions between that which is immediate and that which is objective, the ego and the alter are to our thought one and the same thing.” (p. 12)

the interest of shaping the perceptions of others about themselves) (Leary, 1995), the impact of attachment on self-concept (Bartz & Lydon, 2004), and the influence of culture on the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1998) illuminate the role that the social dimension plays in the individual self.

Nevertheless, in the above personality and self research, social influence is treated as an exogenous variable, focusing on what Dunning (2003) calls the “intrapersonal self,” the internal dynamics of the self in relation to others. He contrasts this with research on the “interpersonal self,” the sense of self “defined by one’s relations with others” (p. 433). This concept is similar to the “collective self” (Spears, Jetten, & Scheepers, 2002), the distinctive sense of self that derives from group membership (p. 147). Also related is research on social identity (in which group membership becomes a part of the self-concept) (Bennett & Sani, 2004), group distinctiveness (where group membership simultaneously promotes a sense of individuality through comparison with other groups) (Brewer, 1991), and self-evaluation maintenance, one part of which is the self’s feeling derived from a partner’s success or failure (Tesser, 1988).²⁴

From another vantage point, Bandura (2001) compares personal agency to “collective agency,” which is the result of “shared intentions, knowledge, and skills” of group members, and the “interactive coordinated, and synergistic dynamics of their transactions” (p. 14). He describes this as an “emergent group-level property,” that cannot be reduced to individual dynamics. However, he pulls back from referring to this as a discrete, dialectical phenomenon, distinguishable from psychological and social dynamics.

This diverse body of literature focuses on the *interdependence* of the self and other in relationships (Vohs & Finkel, 2006). Such a phenomenon could be treated as simply a subcategory under the form of the self (where it is usually addressed). However, there is abundant empirical evidence that it transcends the self, indeed, that transcends more than a group of selves. In addition, this perspective may be helpful as a conceptual check against the distortions of individualism. Consequently, it seems necessary to identify this as a distinct form, which will be termed *communion*.

3.6.1. *The unique nature of communion*

The term communion has been used previously to refer to a personality dimension or theme, or a trait of the personality signature (Bakan, 1966; McAdams, 1985, 1993; Paulhus & Trapnell, 2008; Wiggins, 1991; often paired with agency). The use of the term in this chapter is admittedly a significant extension of its meaning, but it is believed that a comprehensive understanding of the whole human being warrants it. Just as personal agency emerges from simpler, lower-level dynamics, so communion emerges from

simpler, and more organismic dynamics of the individual and the other. Including communion as a form will strike some as counterintuitive, since it locates the phenomenon of interest in neither the self nor the relationship or group, both seemingly more obviously empirical than their dialectical relation. However, the self is one object of investigation, the other is a second object, and the relation between them is a third. As suggested above, a strong relationality orientation views social relations differently than the more traditional and atomistic approach to social relations (what Slife [2004] calls weak relationality). This move is akin to the distinction between a Newtonian perspective in physics, which deals with physical objects in the universe and their effects upon each other, and field theory, Einsteinian and Quantum mechanics perspectives, which make relationship central. Ecology developed much later in biology than did botany and zoology, because it is the study of the *relationships* between the plants and animals in a given environment. Because of its greater complexity, understanding relations between things usually follows understanding first the things themselves.

Though it has limitations for the study of higher-order human phenomena, systems theory has been used in psychology and psychotherapy to comprehend phenomena that can understood at different levels of complexity. Family-systems psychotherapy approaches the relation of the family as the unit of interest and object of intervention. Similarly, Bronfenbrenner (1979), in his model of *ecological* psychology, recognized different kinds of social relationships as distinct systems, including face-to-face relationships, which he termed *microsystems*.

Communion, then, is a psychological, dialectical whole, a single unit of analysis composed of “ego” and “alter” (Oglivie, Fleming, & Pennell, 1998), irreducible to its parts, identifiable in the meaningful relations between two (or more) humans and the quality of their intersubjectivity. In this case, the form is *the relationship*. Individuals may exist in dozens of this form, and the features of each are amenable to empirical description and analysis (see Oglivie et al., 1998). Why *not* regard it is a distinct species of the human form? Its implausibility to some could be a function of the strong individuality orientation that continues to influence Western thought. Communion offers a another important way of conceiving of individual human beings: as *co-beings* (Holquist, 1990), they exist *in* and *with* one another, they are selves-in-relationship (Agnew & Etcheverry, 2006), or selves-with-others (Oglivie et al., 1998), and only by taking such a conceptually far-reaching step can proper justice be done to the communal nature of human beings.

Relationships vary in so many ways, including the nature of their dialogue (as well as silence); the presence of marital and family bonds; their balance of power and mutuality; interpersonal boundaries; ethical obligations to the other and sense of obligation; degree of intimacy and differentiation, enmeshment and disengagement; rules that guide the relationship; gender and sexual dynamics; affection felt for the other; degree of empathy; affective tone; love and trust; hate, coercion, and aggression; and so on. Communion can also vary in the number of persons in the relationship in question. For example, it is possible for six members of a long-term therapy group to experience

²⁴ Along similar lines, read Aron, Aron, Tudor, and Nelson (1991) who found that in closer relationships, the self includes within itself information that actually pertains to another person, and Agnew and Etcheverry (2006) who report highly committed couples are more likely to use plural pronouns (we, us, ours) than those low in dependence.

for a time a greater sense of intimacy, affection, and mutuality, than many a dull and lifeless marriage. Communion is obviously a dynamic concept, necessarily involving narrative action, turn-taking, and waves of emotional intensity. A plethora of social phenomena fall within the category of communion.

3.7. Narrative

Over the past 30 years, many different psychologists have been paying attention to narrative in their investigations, so much so that narrative psychology could be considered a burgeoning subdiscipline all its own. Some personality psychologists (especially Dan McAdams, 1993, 2008b) have successfully shown how narrative provides an important holistic understanding of the psychology of the individual. “Life stories organize disparate experience into integrated wholes” (McAdams, 1999, p. 488). If personality is the *only* way to model the whole human, then narrative must be fit into that category. However, it seems quite clear that narrative has very different properties from personality (and self, for that matter), as well as all the other forms we have so far considered. A form psychology would give psychologists interested in the whole human the conceptual freedom to give this important model its own place. What is distinctive about narrative?

To begin with, narrative is an essentially *temporal* form, and so is stretched out over time. The models we have considered so far are holistic organizations of the immaterial dynamic (changing) structures of the whole human; they are structured realities that are always changing. A narrative is conceptually the opposite: it is primarily a temporal, changing reality that has structure. As a result, this “map” is substantially different from the others, since it represents the sequential, linear unfolding of an individual’s story. Narrative is also the most idiographic of forms. People can share the same personality traits, but no two people have anything like the same story.

3.7.1. The basic temporal structure of a narrative

Human narratives are necessarily centered and focalized in the present, within the context of one’s past, and projected out into the future. Profoundly and mysteriously, humans are inescapably living at a certain point in the flow of history. This is the continually moving center of one’s narrative. Because normal, mature humans have memories (and the requisite brain structures), they can recall and reflect on past (reconstructed) events, and their present experiences are inevitably interpreted in light of their past. Exploring the impact of this historical dimension of human life has been another important contribution of modern psychology. However, because personal agents are actors in their narrative, their stories can take turns that cannot be entirely deterministically predicted in terms of the influential events of their past.

In addition, humans are strongly future-oriented. They have assumptions about the future, fears of what could happen (which can dominate their consciousness, as in anxiety disorders), hopes and expectations, goals, plans, and ambitions (as well as the lack of such), so a portion of

most humans’ lives are spent looking ahead to what will be (helping to shape the future in the process).

3.7.2. Key features of a narrative

Human narratives are mostly stories about personal agents in relationship with other personal agents—all of whom have experiences, motives, desires, plans, and values. Some agents live out the roles bestowed on them by others (e.g., the family “black sheep” or “golden boy”). According to McAdams (1993), agents also form “imagoes,” an idealized concept of the self that shapes one’s story. Narratives typically have distinct narrative themes or scripts (Tompkins, 1979)—defeat, triumph, tragedy, success, discovery—and these themes tend to be repeated throughout life, unless there is some effort directed at a reinterpretation, a possibility Ricoeur (1984) called “*emplotment*.”

Narrative theorists have noted that, at least with regard to written narratives, climaxes in the story often relate to obstacles in the natural and social worlds to the protagonist’s goals or perturbations in a previous equilibrium of life, which are usually overcome or resolved, but in some cases, overcome the protagonist (Budnizkiewicz, 1998). As people make sense of their own stories, the challenges they encounter and their success or failure in meeting them form key events that shape the narrative they are constructing.

Narratives also have a moral dimension (McAdams, 2008a). “Narrative requires an evaluative framework in which good or bad character helps to produce unfortunate or happy outcomes” (MacIntyre, 1989, p. 141). They typically concern the morally significant actions of the protagonist and the other notable persons in the story, the morally significant consequences of those actions, and how they are handled and resolved provide dramatic intensity. The moral dimension heightens a story’s significance. Of special note is the character development of the major personal agents in a story.

Narratives also include the sociohistorical context of the communal interactivity of personal agents, with distinct personalities- and self-understandings, who are becoming better or worse characters. In a satisfying way, given our storied nature, the form of narrative weaves the forms together.

3.8. The *imago Dei*

Another model of the whole human that reaches far back into the Western tradition is the *imago Dei*.²⁵ The three major monotheistic religions of the West (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) all base their view of human beings on this concept, and it offers a unique vantage point on the whole human. Some psychologists may consider reference to this concept inappropriate here, believing that the *imago Dei* concept belongs in theology, not psychology (at best,

²⁵ The Latin form of this concept is used to distinguish it from a very different psychological construct, the God-image, which is the mental representation one has of God (see Moriarty & Hoffman, 2007).

perhaps psychology of religion), so some justification of its inclusion is probably necessary.

To begin with, though originally developed in theological literature, the *imago Dei* concept also pertains to the psychological nature of human beings, and its implications bear on many related psychological concepts. The psychology of the West before 1800 only existed in theological and philosophical literature, and many major psychological concepts still in use were first discussed there (mind, memory, reasoning, affection, habit, self-deception, and love), so an exercise in retrieval may be productive (consider the value of such work evident in the *Handbook of Character Strengths & Virtues*, Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Second, the study of folk psychology concepts has a legitimate place in a science of psychology (Fletcher, 1995; Steuber, 2006; Thomas, 2001) going back to Wilhelm Wundt (2008)! Indeed, it helps tether psychological theory to the world of human life (Taylor, 1985, 1989). Many people in the West subscribe to Jewish, Christian, and Islamic beliefs about human beings, so interest in them and their influence on the development of the whole human within important subcultures would seem of psychological significance, particularly in a pluralistic culture like the West. Presumably an article on form psychology written by an Asian psychologist would have one or two distinct forms. Perhaps ironically, in the last decade, Buddhist personality theory has begun finding its way into Western psychological literature, including personality texts (e.g., Davidson & Harrington, 2001; Engler, 2009; Epstein, 2007; Wallace & Shapiro, 2006).

According to human science and cross-cultural approaches to psychology, aspects of human life will likely be missed when distinct approaches to human life are excluded *a priori* from its purview by majority assumptions, whether methodological (e.g., natural science methods), worldview (e.g., naturalism), or philosophical (e.g., positivism), instead of allowing the object of the science itself to constrain its focus: human life as actually lived, ideally in all of its sociohistorical contexts. So, similar to how an individualist psychology might have difficulty accepting the form of communion, a secularist psychology would likely have difficulty accepting the form of the *imago Dei*.

Some might object that the difference is that psychology aims at being a universal science, so it is not permissible to include concepts that are only embraced by a minority of persons. However, that does not prevent psychologists from studying autism or giftedness. More importantly, a human science like psychology necessarily deals with phenomena that are themselves socially constituted and maintained, within communities that have assumptions some of which are not shared by others. As a result, a more complex philosophy of psychological science is now required for advances in psychological research that recognizes the role of culture in shaping what exists psychologically. This more postmodern awareness already funds cross-cultural psychology and feminist psychology, and it deserves broader acceptance in the field. Forms are themselves socially constituted, and not all forms will be or can be accepted by everyone interested in the study of the subject matter. Only theistic psychologists will likely find

research on the *imago Dei* meaningful and compelling (full disclosure: I am one); similarly, those more sympathetic to Buddhism will likely find the “egolessness” model of personality of greater interest. As greater cross-cultural sensibility leads to a more comprehensive understanding of human beings as they actually live—within communities—the field will eventually have to accept a more pluralist psychology (Johnson & Watson, 2012).

The fact is the science of psychology has often borrowed from other disciplines for insights and models, for example, physics, computer science, and biology. A broad interdisciplinarity is considered obligatory for a personality science by some (Cervone & Mischel, 2002, p. 7). Why should the conceptual work of *theology* be rendered ineligible *a priori* from consideration by psychologists? In spite of the fact that religion is a ubiquitous human experience, studying the relation between religion and personality has only recently begun (Emmons, Barrett, & Schnitker, 2008). Positive psychology has reminded us that a focus on transcendence and spirituality are appropriate concerns for a science of human beings (Peterson & Seligman, 2004).

Slife and Reber (2009) have argued that the naturalism assumed in modern psychology is logically incompatible with theism and has prejudiced the field from taking seriously psychological understandings derived from a theistic orientation. Each worldview is beyond indisputable proof (to non-adherents) and involves pretheoretical commitments that orient scientific research and theory in certain directions. So, while some psychologists committed to naturalism might believe that the concept of the *imago Dei* as a model of the whole human is misguided, if not unscientific, that is no reason for psychologists committed to theism to consider such opinions to be persuasive arguments. In light of the above considerations, the value of the *imago Dei* will be explored for what it might offer a psychology of the whole human.

3.8.1. *The basic meaning of the imago Dei*

Little explanation of the meaning of the *imago Dei* is given in the first chapter of the Bible (Gen 1:27–28), where it is first found in Western literature, but it has spawned centuries of reflection nonetheless. In light of research of the relevant texts (including the texts of related cultures), it suggests that humans are considered to be concrete images or representations on earth of an invisible God. There are two basic directions Christian interpretation has gone to explain what this image means.²⁶ One is to describe features of human beings that are believed to be similar to features that the God of Western monotheism also possesses: reasoning and wisdom, emotionality, personality, freedom and personal agency, relationality, virtuous character, and oversight of the creation are some of the most common features identified (Aquinas, 1949; Bavinck, 2004; Placher, 2003). Since these features develop throughout childhood and into adulthood, it suggests that the *imago Dei* also develops over time (Grenz, 2000; Pannenberg, 1985). Considered as a form, this

²⁶ Being most familiar with the Christian tradition, I will restrict most of my comments to that model.

interpretation brings out the transcendent, “pointing function” that the whole human has. A human being is considered a *sign* of God: similar to, but different from the form of God. Such an assumption bestows transcendent meaning and dignity on human life that many find encouraging, enlightening, and morally significant. Conversely, the recognition that one is merely an *image* of God—and not God—would seem to help check unhealthy perfectionism and narcissism.

Another common interpretation considers the *imago Dei* more like a mirror than a pattern of similarities to God (Barth, 1960; Calvin, 1960). This approach understands the *imago Dei* as essentially dynamic and relational, and emphasizes the interpersonal and narrative quality of one’s relationship with God and the transcendent dimension of all of human life. This orientation is reflected in Søren Kierkegaard’s (1849/1980b) definition of faith as “that the self in being itself and in willing to be itself rests transparently in God” (p. 82). Here the focus is more teleological: imaging God means to cultivate the virtues of faith and love as one’s form is being transformed more and more into a likeness of the beautiful, virtuous character of God, becoming *more* whole, the more one is rightly related to one’s Creator. This orientation has provided a transcendent hope for members of the three theistic religions of the West. At the same time, all three religions teach that the human relationship with God has been compromised by human sin, and they each offer distinct models of the quest for God-likeness.

Based on *imago Dei* teaching, some theists have developed a view of human beings as being intrinsically oriented toward some ultimate concern (Emmons, 1999; Tillich, 1957) usually transcendent, but not necessarily (e.g., humanism, Marxism, or working for a meaningful cause, like exposing political corruption). The human quest for meaning and significance that logotherapy, and existential and narrative therapy have sought to address is given a theistic rationale with this form.

It should be obvious that these considerations are fundamentally psychological in nature. Over the centuries in the West, and now increasingly in many different cultures, the *imago Dei* concept has provided a major sense of unity, coherence, and meaningfulness in human life, tying together all of one’s life in relation to God. As a result, for theists the *imago Dei* provides a way to integrate all the forms we have considered under a transcendent, unifying, spiritual orientation. How can one investigate empirically the *imago Dei*? Psychology of religion has been doing that, in some sense, indirectly, for decades.

3.9. Additional candidates?

Clearly the list of forms addressed in this article is not definitive. Probably no list of the forms should be considered final. Perhaps there are dozens of worthwhile ways of conceiving of the whole human, and there are some good candidates left out of the above discussions. The *ego* has a long history in the 20th century within the psychoanalytic tradition. It was mentioned in the discussion of personal agency, but research on the *ego* has tended to discuss concepts like *ego-strength* and *defense*

mechanisms, which are not usually discussed under personal agency. So, some might argue that the *ego* is a distinct form.

Feminists have identified *voice* as an important way of thinking about the whole human. This form has some important and unique features. Consideration of *voice* focuses our attention on the ability to express oneself, mostly obviously through speech, but also implied is one’s expression through writing and body language, and what is more basic to a person than expressing oneself? In addition, this form includes reference to the strength of the individual to speak, since there are individual differences regarding one’s willingness or ability to speak, which we now know can be tragically inhibited as a result of the abuse of others. Speaking is a kind of action, so *voice* is related to personal agency and character, but gives us a way to see a different constellation of the human person.

Finally, sociologists and social psychologists have studied the *roles* that people perform, in various social settings and based on individual differences, calling, and obligations. Depending on such factors, individuals can perform a variety of roles on any given day. Yet each role can be seen as a holistic configuration of the person. Moreover, role has also been applied to sex and gender issues, a topic of great fascination and no small importance. Presumably there are other good candidates of psychological forms.

4. The nature and bases of the pluriform

Given that multiple forms have been identified, there is an obvious danger that form psychology could lead paradoxically to greater fragmentation, than comprehensiveness. To help prevent that and to underscore the fundamental psychological unity of normal human life, the term *pluriform* will be used to refer to the actual whole human being, the Whole of wholes, the entire human viewed psychologically.

The metaphysical nature of what is here called the pluriform is a hotly contested subject in contemporary philosophy, and it is not necessary to enter that debate here. However, it is necessary to acknowledge that the dynamic structures that compose the pluriform (its many psychological features), while themselves immaterial, are embodied and grounded in or based in biological dynamic structures (Bhaskar, 1997; Collier, 1994).

4.1. Material bases of the pluriform

4.1.1. The embodied pluriform

Our exclusive focus on the psychological nature of the forms has by now created a false impression of their pure immateriality. Yet—to state the obvious—they are actually embodied, and their embodied nature is foundational to each form. Personality signatures are expressed in body language and facial expressions; one’s self-representation includes knowledge of one’s body, including one’s sex and physical capacities; personal agents alter their physical and social contexts through behavioral actions; character is regularly expressed through outward moral and immoral deeds; communion is experienced with and through the

body; one's narrative (or drama) is essentially the story of an embodied life, enacted before and with others, moving about and producing things; and the *imago Dei* expresses itself verbally through praise, and caring for others and the natural environment. The single bodily form of each psychological pluriform is its physical unity, locus, and presence. Frankly, it would have been better to address embodiment with each form, and in a lengthier discussion, it would have been.

4.1.2. *The biological grounds of the pluriform*

We only have space to acknowledge that research is beginning to document the genetic mechanisms and neural architecture underlying the forms and their development. For example, dedicated neural regions have been found that correspond to the major modules of personality architecture (Grigsby & Stevens, 2000); there is evidence of substantial genetic influence on one's personality signature (Reif & Lesch, 2003); and brain regions appear to be implicated in some traits, though evidence for others has been harder to obtain (Pickering & Gray, 1999). Narrative and communion are shaped by attachment experiences that are laid down in early childhood in neural memory structures (Fonagy, Gergely, Just, & Target, 2002; Main, 1995; Siegel, 1999). The psychological processes involved in personal agency are based in the frontal lobes (Murphy & Brown, 2009), and regions dedicated to religious experience (and hence the *imago Dei*) are found throughout the brain (d'Aquili & Newberg, 1999). However, research on the neuropsychology grounding the forms is largely in its infancy.

4.2. *The ecology of the pluriform*

The forms develop over time within various social and cultural relationships and contexts. In addition to the most basic social relationships within the microsystem of family, peers, friends, neighbors, and coworkers that facilitate the pluriform's development, the forms are constituted within many diverse higher-order social structures that necessarily influence their "shape." Mention should be made of cultural and subcultural beliefs and practices; different kinds of media; institutions that affect the forms, including schools, government agencies, economies, places of employment, hospitals and so on. The forms themselves are affected by such dynamics (which have been studied in cross-cultural personality psychology, at least so far with reference to personality and the self; see e.g., Benet-Martinez & Oishi, 2008; Triandis, 1997).

4.3. *Interrelationships between forms*

The forms obviously "overlap" or "permeate" each other, since they are grounded on the same brain and share the same neural structures, singularly embodied, and partake of some of the same psychological elements (beliefs, emotional patterns, action dispositions, and so on). Consequently, one of the great challenges of a form psychology will be to understand their profound and complex interrelations. Let us touch on just a few of the ways they are related.

To begin with, one's self-representation (self-perception) affects personality signature formation, personal agency (Harter, 1999; consider self-efficacy beliefs, Bandura, 1997, and self-theories, Dweck, 2000) as well as character (Bandura, 1999, 2001). One's personality architecture and signature and one's character are developed and expressed through the course of one's narrative/drama as a personal agent who acts, reacts, and interacts. Communion is affected by one's personality signature (e.g., introversion and agreeableness), as well as one's self-representation, personal actions, and character. The formation of one's character is the product of one's actions as a personal agent. In the future, it will be necessary to integrate the bodies of literature pertaining to each form into a more comprehensive understanding—so the term *pluriform* is a conceptual goal as well as a label for the entire whole human.

5. **The value of mapping the field of the whole human**

Personality psychology continues today to be a vibrant and important subdiscipline in psychology, having emerged stronger in recent years by addressing the problems surrounding trait and social context interaction. However, concerns have been raised about the limitations that remain, and worthwhile attempts have been made that offer significant adjustments (see e.g., Mayer, 2005; McAdams & Pals, 2006²⁷).

One problem facing the field is its curricular organization based on the historical development of personality psychology in the 20th century, rather than on the actual phenomena of the whole human itself. As a result, some of the best current textbooks summarize the field according to various *schools* of personality, with chapters on the "psychoanalytic," "neanalytic," "learning," "trait," "phenomenological," "cognitive," and "social cognitive" perspectives, for example (see Barone, Hersen, & Van Hasselt, 1998; Carducci, 2009; Carver & Scheier, 2004; Cervone & Pervin, 2008; Mischel et al., 2004).

Proponents themselves recognize more is needed. Carver and Scheier (2004) advocate an *eclectic* approach that values the contributions of the respective perspectives, but leaves the reader to pick the theory that "you like best" (p. 518). Though likely popular with undergraduates, it offers little help for integrating the different models. By contrast, Mischel et al. (2004) present an *integrative* format, where they categorize the schools according to various "levels" of human nature. But even with these modifications, the "schools" classification framework is ultimately constrained by the particularities of 20th century history of American psychology, and it leads to a "slicing of the pie" of the whole human according to sociohistorically-formed theoretical orientations, rather than by the actual nature of the object of inquiry. History is very important for understanding a science, but should history's

²⁷ McAdams and Pals (2006) offer a reformulation of personality psychology that has some similarities with what was attempted here in their categorical distinctions between the dispositional signature, characteristic adaptations, and narrative.

particularities be allowed to dictate its conceptual organization? Furthermore, is this really the best format pedagogically to introduce people to the science of the whole human? Would anyone argue that the framework itself has been molded by the best thinking and research available, or is it rather simply a function of a long-standing traditional organization, going back at least to the 50s, that needs to be reexamined?

Others have rethought the tradition more radically, organizing it according to the diverse, extant bodies of research in the field, and in the process have illuminated important aspects of the person (see Feshbach, Weiner, & Bohart, 1995; Larson & Buss, 2009; McAdams, 2008b; Pervin, 1996). However, the well-known limitation of a more empirically driven approach is it results in useful topical organizations of the various *parts* of the whole human, for example, trait, cognitive, or motivational units; personality development; the unconscious; the self; and emotions, but an understanding of the *whole human*, paradoxically, can be undermined, which is, after all, the purported focus of the subdiscipline.

An even more foundational critique has been attempted in this article, where it has been alleged that the traditional (positivistic) conceptual constraints of 20th century personality psychology has hindered, in some important respects, its laudable scientific goal of understanding the whole human and so resulted in an unnecessarily restricted model of humanity. Let us summarize the most serious problems. First, since the 1930s one term has been used as the label for the entire field. Second, this label obscures what are actually two distinct models of personality (at least to those outside the circle of those most knowledgeable of the field). Third, the self consequently has existed on the periphery of the field since that time—though its role has expanded in recent decades, because of its burgeoning literature—but little explanation is usually given regarding how the self fits into *personality* psychology; this is typically left something of a mystery. Fourth, the very important distinction between the self as subject and self as object is not always consistently and thoroughly brought out. Fifth, the literature on the self as subject in psychology has not been well integrated with other literatures closely related to it conceptually, those that focus on the human, moral, or personal agent, particularly in philosophy. Sixth, the social dimension has always been recognized, but usually only with reference to personality or the self. This has expressed and reinforced the individualism of American psychology, by implying that the social is merely an influential variable, rather than a way of human being—such an orientation cannot do justice to the fundamentally social quality of human life. Seventh, character has been almost completely neglected in the field for over a century, though positive psychology has been pointing the way back. Eighth, over the past two decades narrative has been rightly accorded a place in the field, but it too suffers from second-class citizenship in a field labeled *personality* science, so its significance in the field is undoubtedly less than is warranted. Ninth, while not everyone will be persuaded that the *imago Dei* belongs in a science of the whole human, theists might consider its absence an ultimate concern of its own.

Many of these shortcomings are in large part just due to the enormous complexity of human beings, the massive amount of information that has accumulated over the past 100 years (indeed, 3000 years!), and the various legitimate molar and molecular perspectives that together have necessitated greater specialization. Nonetheless, some of the fault might also lie with an antiquated and ultimately faulty set of theoretical assumptions, which requires a fundamental reassessment. Perhaps a reconfiguration of the subdiscipline into a science of forms would provide a more comprehensive, parsimonious, and valid framework. Such an agenda would allow each form of the whole human to be given its due.

Perhaps the greatest strength of form psychology is that philosophical assumptions and methodological constraints are not allowed to preclude the recognition of certain widely recognized forms of human being. For example, philosophical analysis and human science methods have so far been more useful for understanding personal agency and character than the experimental and survey methods more common in mainstream psychology (though positive psychology is challenging this assertion). Each form (map/frame/perspective/model) illuminates a distinct set of features of the whole human, and altogether they help us in psychology's scientific quest to describe human beings with the greatest comprehensiveness possible.

That is not to say that there are no limitations with the proposed framework. Distinguishing the forms as sharply as has been done in this article creates conceptual barriers between the forms that will have to be overcome in conceptual integration (touched on above). Furthermore, it could be argued that the door is opened too wide and that any notion of the whole human could be allowed in. Without positivist methodological restraints, what will guide psychology? This concern, unfortunately, is too large to address in what is already an overlong article. However, interested readers are encouraged to consult contemporary philosophy of science and epistemology, which overturned the traditional approach decades ago and have developed rational alternatives that are more fitting for a science of human beings (see endnote¹).

Caution is certainly justified when proposing the kind of fundamental reframing advocated here. However, it is hoped that sufficient evidence has been given to make such psychological cartography compelling and warranted.

References

- Adams, R. M. (1999). *Finite and infinite goods: A framework for ethics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Agnew, C. R., & Etcheverry, P. E. (2006). Cognitive interdependence: considering self-in-relationship. In K. D. Vohs, & E. J. Finkel (Eds.), *Self and relationships: Connecting intrapersonal and interpersonal processes* (pp. 274–293). New York: Guilford.
- Aiken, L. R. (1993). *Personality: Theories, research, & applications*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Allport, G. W. (1937). *Personality: A psychological interpretation*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Allport, G. W. (1961). *Pattern and growth in personality*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Alston, W. P. (1992). Conceptual analysis and psychological theory. In S. Koch, & D. E. Leary (Eds.), *A century of psychology as science* (pp. 638–653). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Alston, W. P. (2006). *Beyond justification: Dimensions of epistemic evaluation*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Anderson, J. R., Bothell, D., Byrne, M. D., Douglass, S., Lebiere, C., & Qin, Y. (2004). An integrated theory of the mind. *Psychological Review*, *111*, 1036–1060.
- Aquinas, T. (1949). *Basic writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*. New York: Random House.
- Aristotle. (1985). *Nicomachean ethics*. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Aron, A., Aron, E. N., Tudor, M., & Nelson, G. (1991). Close relationships as including other in the self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *60*(2), 241–253.
- Ashcraft, M. H. (2005). *Cognition* (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Audi, R. (2002). *Epistemology: A contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge*. New York: Routledge.
- Augoustinos, M., Walker, I., & Donaghue, N. (2006). *Social cognition: An integrated introduction*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Baer, J., Kaufman, J. C., & Baumeister, R. F. (2008). *Are we free? Psychology and free will*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bakan, D. (1966). *The duality of human existence: Isolation and communion in western man*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Baldwin, J. M. (1891). *Handbook of psychology, Vol. 2. Feeling and will*. New York: Henry Holt & Col.
- Baldwin, J. M. (1897). *Social and ethical interpretations in mental development: A study in social psychology*. New York: Macmillan.
- Baldwin, J. M. (1911). *The individual and society, or psychology and sociology*. London: Rebman Ltd.
- Bandura, A. (1989). Human agency in social cognitive theory. *American Psychologist*, *44*(9), 1175–1184.
- Bandura, A. (1997). *Self-efficacy: The exercise of control*. New York: Worth.
- Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *3*, 193–209.
- Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: an agentic perspective. *Annual Review*, *52*, 1–26.
- Bandura, A. (2002). Selective moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. *Journal of Moral Education*, *31*, 101–119.
- Bandura, A., Caprara, G. V., Barbaranelli, C., Pastorelli, C., & Regalia, C. (2001). Sociocognitive self-regulatory mechanisms governing transgressive behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *80*(1), 125–135.
- Barenbaum, N. G., & Winter, D. G. (2010). History of modern personality theory and research. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (3rd ed.). (pp. 3–28) New York: Guilford.
- Barone, D. F., Hersen, M., & Van Hasselt, V. B. (Eds.). (1998). *Advanced personality*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Barth, K. (1960). *Church dogmatics: 3.2 (H. Knight, J. K. S. Reid, & R. H. Fuller, Trans.)*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.
- Bartz, J., & Lydon, J. E. (2004). Close relationships and the working self-concept: implicit and explicit effects of priming attachment on agency and communion. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *30*, 1389–1401.
- Baumeister, R. F. (1987). How the self became a problem: a psychological review of historical research. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *52*(1), 163–176.
- Baumeister, R. F. (1999). The nature and structure of the self: an overview. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), *The self in social psychology* (pp. 1–20). New York: Psychology Press.
- Baumeister, R. F., Mele, A. R., & Vohs, K. D. (2010). *Free will and consciousness: How might they work?* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bavinck, H. (2004). *God and creation In Reformed dogmatics, Vol. 2*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker.
- Bem, S., & de Jong, H. L. (2006). *Theoretical issues in psychology: An introduction* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Benet-Martinez, V., & Oishi, S. (2008). Culture and personality. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (3rd ed.). (pp. 542–567) New York: Guilford.
- Bennett, M., & Sani, F. (Eds.). (2004). *The development of the social self*. East Sussex, England: Psychology Press.
- Bhaskar, R. (1997). *A realist theory of science* (2nd ed.). London: Verso.
- Bickhard, M. H. (2012). A process ontology for persons and their development. *New Ideas in Psychology*, *30*, 107–112.
- Boring, E. (1950). *A history of modern psychology*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Brandstädter, J. (1998). Action perspectives on human development. In R. M. Lerner (Ed.), *Theoretical models of human development*. In W. Damon (Ed.), *Handbook of child psychology, Vol. 1* (pp. 807–864). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Brentano, F. (1969). *The origin of our knowledge of right and wrong*. London: Routledge & Regan Paul.
- Brewer, M. B. (1991). The social self: on being the same and different at the same time. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *17*, 475–482.
- Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979). *The ecology of human development: Experiments by nature and design*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Budnizkiewicz, T. (1998). Narratology. In P. Bouissac (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of semiotics* (pp. 443–445). New York: Oxford.
- Buss, A. (2001). *Psychological dimensions of the self*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Buss, D. B. (2007). *Evolutionary psychology: The new science of the mind*. Calvin, J. (1960). *Institutes of the Christian religion (F.L. Battles, Trans.)*. Philadelphia: Westminster (Original work published 1559).
- Carducci, B. J. (2009). *The psychology of personality: Viewpoints, research, and application* (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (2004). *Perspectives on personality* (5th ed.). Boston: Pearson.
- Cattell, R. B. (1957). *Personality and motivation structure and measurement*. Yonkers-on-the-Hudson: World Book Co.
- Cervone, D. (2004). The architecture of personality. *Psychological Review*, *111*, 183–204.
- Cervone, D. (2005). Personality architecture: within-person structures and processes. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *56*, 423–452.
- Cervone, D., & Mischel, W. (2002). Personality science. In D. Cervone, & W. Mischel (Eds.), *Advances in personality science* (pp. 1–26). New York: Guilford.
- Cervone, D., & Pervin, L. A. (2008). *Personality: Theory and research*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Churchland, P. M. (1995). *The engine of reasons, the seat of the soul*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Cloninger, C. R. (2003). Completing the psychobiological architecture of personality development: temperament, character, and coherence. In U. M. Staudinger, & U. Lindenberger (Eds.), *Understanding human development: Dialogues with life span psychology* (pp. 159–181). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
- Coie, J. D., & Dodge, K. A. (1998). Aggression and antisocial behavior. In N. Eisenberg (Ed.), *Social, emotional, and personality development*. In W. Damon (Ed.), *Handbook of child psychology, Vol. 2* (pp. 779–862). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Collier, A. (1994). *Critical realism: An introduction to Roy Bhaskar's philosophy*. London: Verso.
- Cooley, C. H. (1902). *Human nature and the social order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Cranach, M., & von Harré, R. (1982). *The analysis of action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cushman, P. (1996). *Constructing the self, constructing America: A cultural history of psychotherapy*. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press.
- d' Aquili, E. G., & Newberg, A. B. (1999). *The mystical mind: Probing the biology of religious experience*. Minneapolis: Fortress.
- Damon, W. (1988). *The moral child: Nurturing children's natural moral growth*. New York: The Free Press.
- Damon, W., & Hart, D. (1988). *Self-understanding in childhood and adolescence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Danziger, K. (1979). The positivist repudiation of Wundt. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, *15*, 205–230.
- Danziger, K. (1990). *Constructing the subject: Historical origins of psychological research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Danziger, K. (1997). *Naming the mind: How psychology found its language*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Danziger, K. (2008). *Marking the mind: A history of memory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Davidson, R. J., & Harrington, A. (2001). *Visions of compassion: Western scientists and Tibetan Buddhists examine human nature*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- de Charms, R. (1968). *Personal causation: The internal affective determinants of behavior*. New York: Academic.
- Deci, & Ryan. (1985). *Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior*. New York: Plenum.
- Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (Eds.). (2002). *Handbook of self-determination research*. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.
- Dennett, D. C. (1984). *Elbow room: The varieties of free will worth wanting*. Cambridge, MA: Bradford.
- Dent, B. D., Torguson, J. S., & Hodler, T. W. (2008). *Cartography: Thematic map design*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Dunning, D. (2003). The relation of self to social perception. In M. R. Leary, & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), *Handbook of self and identity* (pp. 421–441). New York: Guilford.
- Dweck, C. S. (2000). *Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality, and development*. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
- Dweck, C. S., Higgins, E. T., & Grant-Pillow, H. (2003). Self-systems give unique meaning to self variables. In M. R. Leary, & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), *Handbook of self and identity* (pp. 239–252). New York: Guilford.

- Eisenberg, N., & Fabes, R. A. (1998). Prosocial development. In N. Eisenberg (Ed.), *Social, emotional, and personality development*. In W. Damon (Ed.), *Handbook of child psychology, Vol. 2* (pp. 701–778). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Emmons, R. A. (1999). *The psychology of ultimate concerns*. New York: Guilford.
- Emmons, R. A., Barrett, J. L., & Schnitker, S. A. (2008). Personality and the capacity for religious and spiritual experience. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (3rd ed.). (pp. 634–653) New York: Guilford.
- Engler, B. (2009). *Personality theories: An introduction*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Epstein, M. (2007). *Psychotherapy without the self: A Buddhist perspective*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Feshbach, S., Weiner, B., & Bohart, A. (1995). *Personality* (4th ed.). Florence, KY: Wadsworth.
- Fischer, K. W., & Bidell, T. R. (1998). Dynamic development of psychological structures in action and thought. In W. Damon, & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), *Theoretical models of human development. Handbook of child psychology, Vol. 1* (pp. 467–562). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Fletcher, G. J. O. (1995). *The scientific credibility of folk psychology*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Fodor, J. (1983). *The modularity of mind*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E., & Target, M. (2002). *Affect regulation, mentalization, and the development of the self*. New York: Other Press.
- Fraley, R. C., & Shaver, P. R. (2008). Attachment theory and its place in contemporary personality theory and research. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (3rd ed.). (pp. 518–541) New York: Guilford.
- Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. *Journal of Philosophy*, 67(1), 5–20.
- Franklin, S. S. (2010). *The psychology of happiness: A good human life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Funder, D. C. (2008). Persons, situations, and person–situation interactions. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (3rd ed.). (pp. 568–582) New York: Guilford.
- Gazzaniga, M., Ivry, R. B., & Mangun, G. R. (2008). *Cognitive neuroscience: The biology of the mind* (3rd ed.). New York: W. W. Norton.
- Giere, R. N. (1999). *Science without laws*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- Goldie, P. (2004). *On personality*. New York: Routledge.
- Gollwitzer, P. M., & Bargh, J. A. (Eds.). (1996). *The psychology of action: Linking cognition and motivation to behavior*. New York: Guilford.
- Grenz, S. J. (2001). *The social God and the relational self: A Trinitarian theology of the Imago Dei*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox.
- Grigsby, J., & Stevens, D. (2000). *Neurodynamics of personality*. New York: Guilford.
- Grusec, J. (2006). The development of moral behavior and conscience from a socialization perspective. In M. Killen, & J. G. Smetana (Eds.), *Handbook of moral development* (pp. 243–266). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), *The affective sciences* (pp. 852–870). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hall, C. S., & Lindzey, G. (1957). *Theories of personality*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Halverson, C. F., Jr., & Wampler, K. S. (1997). Family influences on personality development. In R. Hogan, J. Johnson, & S. Briggs (Eds.), *Handbook of personality psychology* (pp. 241–268). New York: Academic Press.
- Harré, R. (1984). *Personal being: A theory of individual psychology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Harré, R. (1998). *The singular self: An introduction to the psychology of personhood*. London: Sage.
- Harter, S. (1999). *The construction of the self: A developmental perspective*. New York: Guilford.
- Hartshorne, H., & May, M. A. (1930). *Studies in the nature of character*. New York: Macmillan.
- Hauser, S. T. (2000). Ego. In A. E. Kazdin (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of psychology, Vol. 3* (pp. 142–144). Washington, D.C./Oxford: American Psychological Association/Oxford University Press.
- Hergenhahn, B. R. (1997). *An introduction to the history of psychology*. Pacific Grove, CA: Brook/Cole.
- Higgins, R. L., Snyder, C. R., & Berglas, S. (1990). *Self-handicapping: The paradox that isn't*. New York: Springer.
- Hoffman, M. L. (2000). *Empathy and moral development: Implications for caring and justice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holquist, M. (1990). *Dialogism: Bakhtin and his world*. New York: Routledge.
- Howard, G. S. (1994). Some varieties of free will worth practicing. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*, 14(1), 50–61.
- Hull, C. (1943). *Principles of behavior: An introduction to behavior theory*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- James, W. (1890). *Principles of psychology*. New York: Henry Holt & Co.
- Jastrow, J. (1921). *Character and temperament*. New York: D. Appleton & Co.
- John, O. P. (Ed.). (2008). *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (3rd ed.). New York: Guilford.
- Johnson, E. L., & Watson, P. J. (2012). Worldview communities and the science of psychology. In R. L. Piedmont, & A. Village (Eds.), *Research in the social scientific study of religion, Vol. 23* (pp. 269–284). Boston: Brill.
- Josephs, L. (1992). *Character structure and the organization of the self*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kammrath, L. K., Mendoza-Denton, R., & Mischel, W. (2005). Incorporating if...then... personality signatures in person perception: beyond the person–situation dichotomy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 88, 605–618.
- Kernberg, O. (1975). *Borderline conditions and pathological narcissism*. New York: Jason Aronson.
- Kierkegaard, S. (1980a). *The concept of anxiety* (R. Thomte, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (Original work published 1844).
- Kierkegaard, S. (1980b). *The sickness unto death* (H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (Original work published 1849).
- Kilborne, B. (1992). Positivism and its vicissitudes: the role of faith in the social sciences. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 28, 352–370.
- Killen, M., & Smetana, J. G. (Eds.). (2006). *Handbook of moral development*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Klein, D. B. (1970). *A history of scientific psychology: Its origins and philosophical backgrounds*. New York: Basic Books.
- Kohlberg, L. (1984). *The psychology of moral development, Vol. II*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Kohut, H. (1977). *The restoration of the self*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Krueger, R. F., & Johnson, W. (2008). Behavioral genetics and personality: a new look at the integration of nature and nurture. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (3rd ed.). (pp. 287–310) New York: Guilford.
- Kühl, J., & Beckmann, J. (1994). *Volition and personality: Action vs. state orientation*. Toronto: Hogrefe and Huber.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1962). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1977). *The essential tension: Selected studies in scientific tradition and change*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos, & A. Musgrave (Eds.), *Criticism and the growth of knowledge* (pp. 91–196). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Larson, R., & Buss, D. (2009). *Personality psychology: Domains of knowledge about human nature*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Leahey, T. H. (1997). *A history of psychology: Main currents in psychological thought*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Leary, M. R. (1995). *Self-presentation: Impression management and interpersonal behavior*. Madison, WI: Brown & Benchmark.
- Leary, M. R., & Tangney, J. P. (2003). The self as an organizing construct in the behavioral and social sciences. In M. R. Leary, & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), *Handbook of self and identity* (pp. 3–14). New York: Guilford.
- Leary, T. F. (1957). *Interpersonal diagnosis of personality: A functional theory and methodology for personality evaluation*. New York: Ronald Press.
- MacIntyre, A. (1984). *After virtue* (2nd ed.). South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- MacIntyre, A. (1988). *Whose justice? Which rationality?* South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- MacIntyre, A. (1989). Epistemological crises, narrative, and philosophy of science. In S. Hauerwas, & L. G. Jones (Eds.), *Why narrative? Readings in narrative theology* (pp. 138–157). Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
- Macmurray, J. (1957). *The self as agent*. London: Humanities Press International.
- Murdoch, I. (1967). *The sovereignty of good over other concepts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Main, M. (1995). Attachment: overview, with implications for clinical work. In S. Goldberg, R. Muir, & J. Kerr (Eds.), *Attachment theory: Social, developmental, and clinical perspectives* (pp. 407–474). Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.
- Markus, H. R. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35, 63–78.

- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1998). The cultural psychology of personality. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 29*, 63–87.
- Marsden, G. (1994). *The soul of the American university: From Protestant establishment to established nonbelief*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Martin, J., Sugarman, J., & Thompson, J. (2003). *Psychology and the question of agency*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Maslow, A. H. (1968). *Toward a psychology of being* (2nd ed.). New York: D. Van Nostrand.
- Mayer, J. D. (1993). A system-topics framework for the study of personality. *Imagination, Cognition, and Personality, 13*(2), 99–123.
- Mayer, J. D. (2005). A tale of two visions: can a new view of personality help to integrate psychology. *American Psychologist, 60*, 294–307.
- McAdams, D. P. (1985). *Power, intimacy, and the life story: Personological inquiries into identity*. New York: Guilford Press.
- McAdams, D. P. (1993). *The stories we live by: Personal myths and the making of the self*. New York: Morrow.
- McAdams, D. P. (1997). A conceptual history of personality psychology. In R. Hogan, J. Johnson, & S. Briggs (Eds.), *Handbook of personality psychology* (pp. 4–40). New York: Academic Press.
- McAdams, D. P. (1999). Personal narratives and the life story. In L. A. Pervin, & O. P. John (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (2nd ed.). (pp. 478–500) New York: Guilford.
- McAdams, D. P. (2008a). Personal narratives and the life story. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin & (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (3rd ed.). (pp. 242–264) New York: Guilford.
- McAdams, D. P. (2008b). *The person: An introduction to the science of personality psychology* (5th ed.). New York: Wiley.
- McAdams, D. P., & Pals, J. L. (2006). A new big five: fundamental principles for an integrative science of personality. *American Psychologist, 61*, 204–217.
- McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T., Jr. (1987). Validation of the five-factor model of personality across instruments and observers. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52*, 81–90.
- McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T., Jr. (2008). The five-factor theory. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), *Handbook of personality* (3rd ed.). (pp. 159–181) New York: Guilford.
- Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, self, & society, from the standpoint of a social behaviorist*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Miller, F. D., Jr. (2003). Aristotle: ethics and politics. In C. Shields (Ed.), *The Blackwell guide to ancient philosophy* (pp. 184–210). New York: Blackwell.
- Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptualization of personality. *Psychological Review, 80*, 252–283.
- Mischel, W. (1992). Looking for personality. In S. Koch, & D. E. Leary (Eds.), *A century of psychology as science* (pp. 515–526). Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
- Mischel, W. (1996). From good intentions to willpower. In P. M. Gollwitzer, & P. Bargh (Eds.), *The psychology of action: Linking cognition and motivation to behavior* (pp. 197–218). New York: Guilford.
- Mischel, W., & Morf, C. C. (2003). The self as a psycho-social dynamic processing system: A meta-perspective on a century of the self in psychology. In M. R. Leary, & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), *Handbook of self and identity* (pp. 15–46). New York: Guilford.
- Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure. *Psychological Review, 102*, 246–268.
- Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (2008). Integrating dispositions and processing dynamics within a unified theory of personality: the cognitive-affective personality system. In L. Pervin, & O. John (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (2nd ed.). (pp. 197–218) New York: Guilford.
- Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Smith, R. E. (2004). *Introduction to personality: Toward an integration* (7th ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Moriarty, G., & Hoffman, L. (2007). *God image handbook for counseling and psychotherapy: Research, theory, and practice*. Clifton, NJ: Haworth.
- Moser, P. K. (Ed.). (2005). *The Oxford handbook of epistemology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Murphy, N., & Brown, W. S. (2009). *Did my neurons make me do it? Philosophical and neurobiological perspectives on moral responsibility and free will*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Murray, H. A. (Ed.). (1938). *Explorations in personality*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Myers, I. B. (1962). *The Myers-Briggs type indicator*. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
- Newton-Smith, W. H. (2000). *A companion to the philosophy of science*. New York: Blackwell.
- Nicholson, I. A. M. (2003). *Inventing personality: Gordon Allport and the science of selfhood*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Nussbaum, M. C. (2001). Character. In (2nd ed.). In L. C. Becker, & C. B. Becker (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of ethics, Vol. 1* (pp. 200–203) New York: Routledge.
- Ogilvie, D. M., Fleming, C. J., & Pennell, G. E. (1998). Self-with-other representations. In D. F. Barone, M. Hersen, & V. B. Van Hasselt (Eds.), *Advanced personality* (pp. 353–376). New York: Plenum Press.
- Pannenberg, W. (1985). *Anthropology in theological perspective*. (M.J. O'Connell, Trans.). Philadelphia: Westminster.
- Paulhus, D. L., & Trapnell, P. D. (2008). Self-presentation of personality: an agency-communion framework. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin & (Eds.), *Handbook of personality* (3rd ed.). (pp. 492–541) New York: Guilford.
- Pervin, L. A. (1996). *A science of personality*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Pervin, L. A. (2000). Personality. In A. E. Kazdin (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of psychology, Vol. 6* (pp. 100–106). Washington, DC/Oxford: American Psychological Association/Oxford University Press.
- Peterson, C. (1988). *Personality*. San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
- Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). *Character strengths and virtues: A handbook and classification*. Washington, DC/New York: American Psychological Association/Oxford University Press.
- Pickering, A. D., & Gray, J. A. (1999). The neuroscience of personality. In L. A. Pervin, & O. P. John (Eds.), *Handbook of personality* (2nd ed.). (pp. 277–299) New York: Guilford.
- Placher, W. C. (Ed.). (2003). *Essentials of Christian theology*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox.
- Polanyi, M. (1958). *Personal knowledge*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Polanyi, M. (1966). *The tacit dimension*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Pomerantz, E. M., & Thompson, R. A. (2008). Parents' role in children's personality development: the psychological resource principle. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (3rd ed.). (pp. 351–374) New York: Guilford.
- Ray, C. (2000). Logical positivism. In W. H. Newton-Smith (Ed.), *A companion to the philosophy of science* (pp. 243–251). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Reich, W. (1945). *Character-analysis*. New York: Orgone Institute Press.
- Reif, A., & Lesch, K.-P. (2003). Toward a molecular architecture of personality. *Behavioral Brain Research, 139*, 1–20.
- Ricoeur, P. (1984). *Time and narrative, Vol. 1*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Roback, A. A. (1928). *The psychology of character*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
- Robins, R. W., Tracy, J. L., & Trzesniewski, K. H. (2008). Naturalizing the self. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (3rd ed.). (pp. 421–447) New York: Guilford.
- Robinson, D. N. (1981). *An intellectual history of psychology* (Rev. ed.). New York: Macmillan.
- Robinson, D. N. (1992). Science, psychology, and explanation: synonyms or antonyms? In S. Koch, & D. E. Leary (Eds.), *A century of psychology as science* (pp. 60–74) Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
- Rogers, C. (1961). *On becoming a person*. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
- Rowe, D. C. (1997). Genetics, temperament, and personality. In R. Hogan, J. Johnson, & S. Briggs (Eds.), *Handbook of personality psychology* (pp. 369–386). New York: Academic Press.
- Rueger, A. (2005). Perspectival models and theory unification. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56*(3), 579–594.
- Sanford, N. (1992). What have we learned about personality? In S. Koch, & D. E. Leary (Eds.), *A century of psychology as science* (pp. 490–514) Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
- Shaffer, D. R. (2005). *Social and personality development* (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Shavelson, R. J., & Bolus, R. (1982). Self-concept: the interplay of theory and methods. *Journal of Educational Psychology, 74*(1), 3–17.
- Siegel, D. J. (1999). *The developing mind*. New York: Guilford.
- Skinner, B. F. (1938). *The behavior of organisms*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Skinner, B. F. (1956). *Science and human behavior*. New York: Macmillan.
- Slife, B. D. (2004). Taking practices seriously: toward a relational ontology. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24*, 158.
- Slife, B. D., & Reber, J. S. (2009). Is there a pervasive implicit bias against theism in psychology? *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 29*(2), 63–79.
- Smith, C. (Ed.). (2003). *The secular revolution: Power, interests, and conflict in the secularization of American public life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Smith, R. H., & Kim, S. H. (2007). Comprehending envy. *Psychological Bulletin*, *133*(1), 46–64.
- Sosa, E. (2009). *A virtue epistemology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Spears, R., Jetten, J., & Scheepers, D. (2002). Distinctiveness and the definition of the collective self: a tripartite model. In A. Tesser, D. A. Stapel, & J. V. Wood (Eds.), *Self and motivation: Emerging psychological perspectives* (pp. 147–171). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Stagner, R. (1937). *Psychology of personality*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Stagner, R. (1974). *Psychology of personality* (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Steel, P. (2007). The nature of procrastination: a meta-analytic and theoretical review of quintessential self-regulatory failure. *Psychological Bulletin*, *133*(1), 65–94.
- Stern, D. N. (1985). *The interpersonal world of the infant: A view from psychoanalysis and developmental psychology*. New York: Basic Books.
- Steuber, K. R. (2006). *Rediscovering empathy: Agency, folk psychology, and the human sciences*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Stevens, S. S. (1935). The operational definition of psychological concepts. *Psychological Review*, *42*, 517–518.
- Stevens, S. S. (1939). Psychology and the science of science. *Psychological Bulletin*, *36*, 221–263.
- Stevens, S. S. (1951). Mathematics, measurement, and psychophysics. In S. S. Stevens (Ed.), *Handbook of experimental psychology* (pp. 1–49). New York: Wiley.
- Stout, J. (1988). *Ethics after Babel: The languages of morals and their discontents*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Suppe, F. (Ed.), (1977). *The structure of scientific theories* (2nd ed.). Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Tangney, J. P., & Dearing, R. L. (2002). *Shame and guilt*. New York: Guilford.
- Taylor, C. (1985). *Human agency and language*. In *Philosophical papers 1*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, C. (1989). *The sources of the self*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Tesser, A. (1988). Toward a self-evaluation maintenance model of social behavior. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experiential social psychology*, Vol. 21 (pp. 181–227). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Thomas, R. M. (2001). *Folk psychologies across cultures*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Thompson, R. A., Meyer, S., & McGinley, M. (2006). Understanding values in relationships: the development of conscience. In M. Killen, & J. G. Smetana (Eds.), *Handbook of moral development* (pp. 267–298). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Thorndike, E. (1905). *The elements of psychology*. New York: A. G. Seiler.
- Tillich, P. (1957). *Dynamics of faith*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. *Psychological Review*, *55*, 189–208.
- Tompkins, S. S. (1979). Script theory. In H. E. Howe, & R. A. Dienstbier (Eds.), *Nebraska symposium on motivation*, Vol. 26 (pp. 201–236). Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press.
- Toulmin, S. (1972). *Human understanding*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Toulmin, S., & Leary, D. E. (1992). The cult of empiricism in psychology, and beyond. In S. Koch, & D. E. Leary (Eds.), *A century of psychology as science* (pp. 592–617). Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
- Triandis, H. C. (1997). Cross-cultural perspectives on personality. In R. Hogan, J. Johnson, & S. Briggs (Eds.), *Handbook of personality psychology* (pp. 440–465). New York: Academic Press.
- Vohs, K. D., & Finkel, E. J. (Eds.), (2006). *Self and relationships: Connecting intrapersonal and interpersonal processes*. New York: Guilford.
- Wallace, B. A., & Shapiro, S. L. (2006). Mental balance and well-being: building bridges between Buddhism and western psychology. *American Psychologist*, *61*, 690–701.
- Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. *Psychological Review*, *20*, 158–177.
- Watson, J. B. (1925). *Behaviorism*. New York: People's Institute.
- Wegner, D. M. (2002). *The illusion of conscious will*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Weiner, B. (1995). *Judgments of responsibility: A foundation for a theory of social conduct*. New York: Guilford.
- Weiner, B. (2005). *Social motivation, justice, and the moral emotions: An attributional approach*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Wertsch, J. V. (1998). *Mind as action*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Westen, D. (1992). The cognitive self and the psychoanalytic self: can we put our selves together? *Psychological Inquiry*, *3*(1), 1–13.
- Wiggins, J. S. (1991). Agency and communion as conceptual coordinates for the understanding and measurement of interpersonal behavior. In D. Cicchetti, & W. Grove (Eds.), *Thinking critically in psychology: Essays in honor of Paul E. Meehl* (pp. 89–113). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wolf, S. (1982). Moral Saints. *Journal of Philosophy*, *79*(8), 419–439.
- Wundt, W. (2008). *Elements of a folk psychology: Outline of a history of the development of mankind*. Philadelphia: Blakiston Press.
- Wylie, R. C. (1961). *The self-concept: A critical survey of recent research literature*. Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press.
- Zagzebski, L. T. (2004). *Divine motivation theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press.